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Common Ground 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a quiet war1 being waged in the world of testamentary 
transfers over how much formality the law should require before giving 
effect to a time-of-death transfer via a will.2  The fight is being played out 
on two fronts.  The first is how much formality the law should require 
before a document qualifies as a validly executed will.3  The second deals 
with the issue of whether a court should have the power to reform an 
unambiguous will.4 
The scholars and estate planning community have split into two 
camps.  In one are the traditionalists.  They tend to favor (1) maintaining 
the prevailing approach to the Wills Act formalities; (2) strict enforcement 
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 1.   A “quiet” war because outside of the world of Wills, Trusts & Estate professors and estate 
planners, most people are oblivious to the battle that is being waged.  Whether that is relevant to the 
battle is an interesting question in itself, but that question is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 2.   There are two principal types of wills: an attested will and a holographic will.  See UNIF. 
PROB. CODE § 2-502 (amended 2019).  Every jurisdiction recognizes attested wills.  See THOMAS P. 
GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 120 
(7th ed. 2019).  Only about half of the jurisdictions recognize holographic wills.  Id.  The focus of this 
Article is attested wills, and thus attested intent.  Any reference to a “will” should be assumed to refer 
to an attested will unless expressly noted otherwise. 
 3.   See infra Parts III, IV, and V; see also John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the 
Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489–91 (1975) [hereinafter Langbein, Substantial Compliance] 
(highlighting the risks with the traditional “literal compliance” approach and calling on courts to adopt 
substantial compliance); Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The 
Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 473 
(2002) (arguing “that judicial leniency toward informal testamentary transactions will undermine the 
channeling function of statutory formalities, either by eroding the social habit of expressing intent in 
standard legal form or by making technically compliant wills less reliable.”). 
 4.   See infra Part VI; see also John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of 
Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 523, 
577–79 (1982) [hereinafter Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills].  
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of those formalities, even if it means occasionally invalidating an intended 
will; and (3) permitting courts to construe an ambiguity in a will, but not 
to reform an unambiguous will.5  In the other camp are the intent-oriented 
advocates.  They tend to favor (1) reducing the Wills Act formalities to a 
minimum; (2) excusing non-compliance with those formalities under the 
harmless error doctrine; and (3) granting courts the power to reform wills, 
even unambiguous wills.6 
While I like to believe I see both sides of the debate, when push comes 
to shove, I tend to come down on the side of the traditionalists.7  Two 
recent developments, however, gave me cause to reconsider, and change, 
my position.8  To fully appreciate these developments, and why they 
should cause one to reconsider his or her position, requires a better 
understanding of the debate. 
II. THE BACKDROP 
In a capitalist system, private property and the right of an owner to 
transfer his or her property are generally well-accepted.9  The right to 
transfer includes time-of-death transfers.10  At time-of-death, if a decedent 
 
 5.   See infra Parts III.B., and VI.A.; see also John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities: How Much 
Compliance is Enough, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 73, 80–81 (2008) (expressing skepticism that 
judges should be allowed to re-write wills due to an erosion of Wills Act formalities).  It should be 
noted that while the traditionalists are often depicted as over-focusing on formalities at the expense of 
testamentary intent, both sides agree testamentary intent is always required for a document to qualify 
as a validly executed will.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 3.1 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“To be a will, the document must be executed by the decedent with 
testamentary intent . . . .”); Thomas v. Copenhaver, 365 S.E.2d 760, 762 (Va. 1988) (“To be a valid 
will, the writing must have been executed with testamentary intent.”).  One can argue that the debate 
is more a question of strict compliance versus “loose” or “relaxed” compliance with the formalities.  
 6.   See infra Parts IV., V., and VI.B.; see also, e.g., J. Rodney Johnson, Dispensing with Wills’ 
Act Formalities for Substantively Valid Wills, 18 VA. B. ASS’N J. 10 (1992); Bridget J. Crawford, Wills 
Formalities in the Twenty-First Century, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 269 (2019). 
 7.   Peter T. Wendel, Wills Act Compliance and the Harmless Error Approach: Flawed 
Narrative Equals Flawed Analysis?, 95 OR. L. REV. 337, 390–95 (2017) [hereinafter, Wendel, Flawed 
Narrative].   
 8.   See infra Part VIII.  
 9.   See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 
YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941); D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36 
(2009); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 742–45 (1998) 
(discussing how the right to transfer both during life and upon death follows logically from the right 
to exclude); Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking Our Own 
Advice, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 345, 345–46 (2006).  
 10.   While the right to transfer property at time-of-death is generally well-accepted, that is not to 
say that all accept it as a right.  No less than the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged as much.  In 
Irving Trust v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942), the Supreme Court acknowledged “[n]othing in the 
Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of 
testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.” (citing Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. 490 
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fails to properly express his or her testamentary intent, the property passes 
through intestacy.11  Historically the most common way of opting out of 
intestacy was to create a will.12  “Whether a document qualifies as a valid 
will is a function of two variables: (1) the Wills Act formalities (i.e., the 
statutory requirements for a valid will), and (2) how strictly the courts 
require a party to comply with the Wills Act formalities.”13 
III. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE WILLS ACT 
A.  The Medieval English Approach 
Given that virtually every American jurisdiction traces its Wills Act 
back to England,14 some might be surprised to learn that there was a time 
when testamentary intent reigned supreme.  The power to transfer property 
at death dates back to Anglo-Saxon times, if not before.15  It evolved out 
 
(1850); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625 (1896)).  See 
also 1 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 3.1 (W. Bowe & D. Parker ed. 1960) [hereinafter PAGE, WILLS].  
In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987), the Supreme Court held Section 207 of the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act unconstitutional, noting that the Act:  
 
[D]estroyed ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property—the right to exclude others.’  Similarly, the regulation here 
amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property—the 
small undivided interest—to one’s heirs.  In one form or another, the right to pass on 
property—to one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American legal system 
since feudal times.  
 
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (citing United States v. Perkins, 163 
U.S. 625, 627–28 (1896)).  See also generally PAGE, WILLS, supra.  
 11.   Intestacy is the state’s presumed intent for a decedent who dies without adequately 
expressing his or her intent.  See Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy 
Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 651 (2002). 
 12.   See Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: 
An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (“[E]state planning, which at one 
time involved not much more than the drafting and execution of a will, is now laden with a multitude 
of fragmented techniques designed to pass along assets at one’s death without the necessity of court 
supervision.” (footnote omitted)); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of 
the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984) [hereinafter Langbein, The Nonprobate 
Revolution] (“The law of wills and the rules of descent no longer govern succession to most of the 
property of most decedents.”) (emphasis added).   
 13.   Wendel, Flawed Narrative, supra note 7, at 339.  See Peter T. Wendel, California Probate 
Code Section 6110(c)(2): How Big is the Hole in the Dike?, 41 SW. L. REV. 387, 387–88 (2012) 
[hereinafter Wendel, California Probate Code Section 6110(c)(2)]; Mark Glover, Minimizing 
Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 341 (2016) [hereinafter, Glover, Minimizing 
Probate-Error] (“In addition to [the Wills Act] formalities, the conventional law includes the rule of 
strict compliance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 14.   See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 15.   See 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
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of local custom,16 in particular the custom that recognized that a person’s 
death-bed confession could include a grant of property to the church for 
the good of one’s soul (i.e., to atone for one’s sins).17  No formalities were 
 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 312 (1895) [hereinafter POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW] (noting that “documents which are often spoken of as Anglo-Saxon wills 
or testaments” date back to the middle of the ninth century.  The rise of the power to devise and the 
law of wills parallels the rise of private property and the power of one to transfer one’s property to 
whom one pleased.); see also THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS AND OTHER 
PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSION INCLUDING INTESTACY AND DECEDENTS’ ESTATES Ch. 1, §§ 2–3 (2nd 
ed. 1953) [hereinafter ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS]; MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF WILLS FOR 
STUDENTS 13–14 (1898) [hereinafter BIGELOW, THE LAW OF WILLS] (describing the Germanic codes’ 
adoption of wills from Roman jurisprudence); see also Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital 
Wills: Has the Time Come for Wills to Join the Digital Revolution?, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 865, 868 
(2007) (“By the eighth century, the ‘will’ was a familiar concept to English law.”) (citing PAGE, 
WILLS, supra note 10 at § 2.7). 
 16.   See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, 
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Sec. 3, 63 n.1 (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES] (acknowledging that English common law was nothing more than general custom 
that had gained general recognition such that the courts would enforce it).  Scholars describe the 
custom that arose during the Saxon period of letting the decedent dispose of some of his chattel.  If 
the decedent was survived by wife and children, the wife received one-third of the decedent’s personal 
property (the “wife’s part”), the children received one-third (the “bairns’ part”), and the decedent had 
the power to dispose of the rest (the “dead’s part”).  See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 314, 318–19, 346, 348–50.  If the decedent was survived only by a 
wife, or only by children, the wife or bairns’ share was one-half and “the dead’s part” was one-half.  
Id. at 346, 348.  If the decedent was not survived by either wife or sons, he could dispose of all personal 
property.  Id.  Professor Atkinson theorizes that one can trace the roots of the English “dead’s part” to 
the Roman legitima.  See ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 9; see also POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 313 (discussing the transferability of 
land at time of death and the interaction between law and custom, with custom typically trumping law 
when the two conflicted): 
 
In the twelfth century it became plain that the Englishman had no power to give freehold 
land by his will, unless some local custom authorized him to do so.  A statute of 1540 . . . 
enabled any person who should ‘have’ any lands as tenant in fee simple to ‘give, dispose, 
will and devise’ the same ‘by his last will and testament in writing.’  Nevertheless, we find 
the court’s holding—and apparently they are but following a rule which had long been 
applied to those wills of land that were sanctioned by local custom—that a will of freehold 
lands is no ambulatory instrument. 
 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 318, 322–29, 347 (discussing (1) the evolution 
of the “cwide” as a legal instrument that came to be recognized under “Anglo-Saxon folk-law” 
(emphasis added), and (2) the evolution of the custom—and then law—permitting (and at the same 
time limiting) a dying individual to transfer a share of his property as he wished (“the new power of 
testation had come to terms with the ancient rights of the wife, the children and the other kinsfolk.”)). 
 17.   Pollock and Maitland note that the Archbishop of York recommended that a priest or deacon 
who knew he was going to hear a death-bed confession should take witnesses with him so that the 
decedent’s intent could be established despite “the avarice of the kinfolk of the dead [who] contradict 
what was said by the clergy . . . .” Id. at 316–17, 340.  See also TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 16, at Sec. 3, 63 n.1 (1803) (acknowledging that English common law 
evolved out of general custom, eventually gaining the status of authority). 
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required.18  “[Wills] could be made by a nod of the head or by other sign 
of assent.”19  Both land and chattels could be devised orally.20  By the tenth 
and eleventh century, however, what had been the death-bed confession 
had evolved into the written “cwide,”21 but only as a practical matter to 
protect one’s intent.22  No law required it to be in writing.23  It was not 
until the Statute of Wills in 1540 that Parliament imposed the formality 
that a will must be in writing—but only for wills that devised land.24  The 
Statute of Wills imposed no other formalities (i.e., the will did not need to 
 
 18.   POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 317 (“And we 
seem to see that they are as a rule spoken, not written, words . . . .”).  Commenting on the medieval 
will, Pollock and Maitland wrote: “It is plain that the church has succeeded in reducing the 
testamentary formalities to a minimum.”  Id. at 335.  The ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over 
the decedent’s personal property and thus over the issue of whether the decedent died with a valid will.  
ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 15, 18.   
 19.   The history behind the evolution of local customs with respect to the transfer of property at 
death to law is long and rather obscure.  Apparently, it began as an inter vivos transfer on one’s death 
bed (the post-obit gift), but with time became accepted as a time-of-death transfer based on the inter 
vivos expression of one’s testamentary intent.  See ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 11–
12; C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination 
of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 
FLA. L. REV. 167, 189 (1991); POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 
15, at 319, 335 (“The dread of intestacy induces us to hear a nuncupative testament in a few hardly 
audible words uttered in the last agony, to see a testament in the feeble gesture which responds to the 
skillful question of the confessor . . . .”). 
 20.   See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 314 
(discussing the notion that a person could dispose of his property after this death “by written or spoken 
words . . . .”).  Following the Norman Conquest and the accompanying rise of feudalism, testamentary 
transfers of land technically were prohibited, but the rise of the use proved a convenient end-run that 
permitted the continued practice of de facto oral time-of-death transfers of land.  See BIGELOW, THE 
LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 24–25; see also Shelby Myrick Jr., Nuncupative Wills, 7 GA. B.J. 
315, 323 (1945) (explaining that “[i]n early English times people were allowed the privilege of making 
oral wills due to a great amount of illiteracy”).   
 21.   POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 317–20; Miller, 
supra note 19, at 189–90. 
 22.   See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 319 (“On 
the whole it seems to us that we have here to deal with a practice which has sprung up among the 
great, a practice which is ill-defined because it is the outcome of privilegia.”); see also ATKINSON, 
LAW OF WILLS,  supra note 15, at 15, 18–19.  The written cwide was employed primarily by “very 
great people, kings, queens, king’s sons, bishops, ealdormen, king’s thegns.”  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 317–18. 
 23.   See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 318–20.  
While the cwide, in many respects, is the precursor of the written will, it was not required to be in 
writing.  And even when it was, it was “an exceedingly formless instrument.”  Id. at 317–18, 335–37.  
See also ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 15, 19; A.W.B. Simpson, The Will in Medieval 
England, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1965).   
 24.   See BIGELOW, THE LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15 at 30–31.  The Statute of Wills, however, 
did not apply to all time-of-death transfers of land.  If local custom permitted oral testamentary 
transfers of land, such custom and practice was exempt from the Statute of Wills.  See PAGE, WILLS, 
supra note 10, at § 23.5.  Moreover, the Statute of Wills was construed as providing that a will had no 
ambulatory effect as applied to land acquired after execution of the will.  See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 313.  Not until the Statute of Frauds in 1837 was a 
will accorded ambulatory effect.  Id.   
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be signed or witnessed),25 and chattel could still be devised orally.26 
The courts were similarly intent oriented.  If there was evidence that a 
party had attempted inter vivos to express his or her time-of-death wishes, 
the courts bent over backwards in their efforts to ascertain and give effect 
to that intent.27  In his fascinating and exhaustive study of early English 
probate, Professor Lloyd Bonfield notes the sympathetic approach the 
courts adopted: 
[J]udges in the Prerogative Court [of Canterbury] in the early modern 
period [the seventeenth century] admitted wills to probate even in 
instances in which it was doubtful that a will conformed to church court 
law’s own minimal due-execution requirements.  They did so in the same 
way as does the modern judge: they created a narrative of what had 
actually transpired by sifting through the evidence, and then they 
surmised as to whether the will-maker intended the document to be his 
or her last will.  If they believed that it did, they ignored the defect and 
proved the will; if they did not, they proclaimed it a nullity.28 
As the noted legal historians Pollock and Maitland concluded about the 
medieval English approach to probate: “[I]ntestacy was rare.  It was easy 
to make a will . . . .”29 
With time, however, England realized that such a legally open-ended 
approach to ascertaining testamentary intent involved high costs of 
administration and opened the probate process to the potential for fraud.30  
In 1677, Parliament adopted the Statute of Frauds31 which substantially 
ratcheted up the formalities for wills devising land.32  The Statute of 
Frauds imposed the formalities that are now commonly associated with 
 
 25.   ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 18. 
 26.   See Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 15, at 870; Miller, supra note 19, at 199. 
 27.   LLOYD BONFIELD, DEVISING, DYING AND DISPUTE: PROBATE LITIGATION IN EARLY 
MODERN ENGLAND 133 (2017) [hereinafter BONFIELD, DEVISING, DYING AND DISPUTE]. 
 28.   Id. 
 29.   POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 15, at 358. 
 30.   BONFIELD, DEVISING, DYING AND DISPUTE, supra note 27, at 244 (“Surely Parliament’s 
goal must have been to bring order and a greater degree of efficiency to the probate of wills.”); see 
also Myrick, supra note 20, at 323. 
 31.   Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2 c. 3 (1677) (Eng.). 
 32.   BONFIELD, DEVISING, DYING AND DISPUTE, supra note 27, at 7. 
 
The Statute of Frauds is arguably the most significant piece of English legislation 
governing the transmission of property ever adopted, because its guiding principle, novel 
in the late seventeenth century though commonplace in our own time, was the insistence 
upon formality in the transfer of property by requiring a written document for particular 
types of transactions to be binding.  
 
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  See also id. at 244 (“Surely Parliament’s goal must have 
been to bring order and a greater degree of efficiency to the probate of wills.”). 
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wills: 
[A]ll devises and bequests of any lands or tenements . . . shall be in 
writing and signed by the party so devising the same or by some other 
person in his presence and by his express directions and shall be attested 
and subscribed in the presence of the said devisor by three or four 
credible witnesses or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect.33 
With respect to devises and bequests of chattels, however, the Statute 
of Frauds adopted a more informal approach.34  While wills devising 
chattel had to be in writing, they were not subject to any of the other 
formalities associated with the contemporary will, and the writing 
requirement did not apply if the will was made in extremis.35  The full set 
of formalities commonly associated with contemporary wills was not 
extended to wills devising chattel until the English Wills Act of 1837.36 
Paralleling the imposition of the statutory formalities, slowly but 
surely, the courts raised the bar on testators, holding them to strict 
compliance with the statutory Wills Act formalities.37  The English legal 
system found this more structured approach to ascertaining testamentary 
intent a significant improvement, so much so that it has pretty much held 
firm with the same formalistic, structured approach to this day.38 
B.  The Traditional American Approach 
The American Revolution was not so much a rebellion against the 
English legal system as it was a rebellion against a tyrannical Parliament.39  
Even after the Revolution, the colonists continued to embrace most of their 
 
 33.   Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2 c. 3, § 5 (1677) (Eng.) (edited to reflect modern spelling); see 
also ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 20. 
 34.   Historically, wills devising chattel were commonly known as testaments.  See ATKINSON, 
LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 19; Miller, supra note 19, at 188, 197–200. 
 35.   Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2 c. 3, § 21 (1677) (Eng.); ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 
15, at 19. 
 36.   English Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26; ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 
15, at  21. 
 37.   See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 3, at 489, 498, 531 (citing J. THAYER, A 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 180, 430–31 (1898)). 
 38.   See ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 22. 
 39.   See ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS, supra note 15, at 21, 23 (noting the continued influence of 
English law of succession on the new nation and how the United States “was spared many of the 
problems of succession which had already been settled by the English.”); see also David Villar Patton, 
The Queen, The Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on 
Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 145 n.96 (2000) (“The former 
colonies ‘were in the curious predicament of rebelling against the British Crown, and yet being forced 
by circumstances to continue operating under British laws.’”) (quoting HOWARD S. MILLER, THE 
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 1776–1844, at 9–10 (1961). 
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English legal ancestry.40  This was particularly true with respect to the 
states’ Wills Acts.41  Virtually every state can trace its Wills Act back to 
either the English Statute of Frauds of 1677 or the English 
Wills Act of 1837.42  Every Wills Act contains three core formalities: 
“[t]he will must be (1) in writing, (2) signed by the testator, and (3) 
witnessed by attesting witnesses.”43  However, no attested Wills Act is that 
simple.  The core formalities have always been accompanied by a plethora 
of ancillary requirements.44  As originally adopted, the English Wills Act 
of 1837 provided: 
[N]o will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing, and executed in 
manner hereinafter mentioned; (that is to say) it shall be signed at the 
foot or end thereof by the testator, or by some other person in his 
presence and by his direction; and such signature shall be made or 
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses 
present at the same time, and such witnesses shall attest and shall 
subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no form of 
attestation shall be necessary.45 
While scholars can squabble over the exact number of formalities the 
English Wills Act of 1837 sets forth, the final count easily reaches double 
digits.46  The early American Wills Acts were equally turgid and verbose.  
 
 40.   See James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 
547–50 (1990) (describing the effect of the English Statute of Wills and Statute of Frauds on American 
law and its continued harshness regarding will formalities); Herbert E. Tucker, David M. Swank & 
Thomas G. Hill, Holographic and Nonconforming Wills: Dispensing with Formalities—Part I, 31 
COLO. LAW. 57, 57 (2002) (noting the influence of the English statutes on modern U.S. probate code). 
 41.   See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Authorizes Notarized Wills, 34 ACTEC J. 83, 83 
(2008). 
 42.   Id.; Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1994); Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Notarized Wills, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419, 
419–20 (2014). 
 43.   See Waggoner, supra note 41, at 83.  
 44.   See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 45.   English Wills Act of 1837, 7 Wm. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26. § 9.  To the extent some may think 
‘that was then, this is now,’ the current version of the English Wills Act substantively is essentially 
the same, though stylistically updated a bit. See Waggoner, supra note 41, at n.3 (citing 
R.E. MEGARRY & H.W.R. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ¶ 14-015 (7th ed. Charles Harpum, 
Stuart Bridge & Martin Dixon 2008)). 
 46.   For example, here is one possible count of the formalities in the Wills Act:  
 
[N]o will shall be valid unless it shall be (1) in writing and executed in manner hereinafter 
mentioned; (that is to say) it shall be (2) signed (3) at the foot or end thereof (4)(a) by the 
testator, or (4)(b) by some other person (4)(b)(i) in his presence and (4)(b)(ii) by his 
direction; and such signature shall be (5)(a) made or (5)(b) acknowledged by the testator 
(6) in the presence of (7) two or more witnesses (8) present at the same time, and such 
witnesses shall (9) attest and (10) subscribe the will (11) in the presence of the testator, but 
no form of attestation shall be necessary.   
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So much for the simple three core formalities. 
Whether a document qualifies as a valid will, however, is not just a 
function of the Wills Act formalities; it is also a function of how strictly 
the courts interpret and enforce those formalities.47  Historically, most 
courts applied a textualist approach,48 giving the statutory formalities their 
plain meaning.49  No attempt was made to take into account the purpose 
behind the Wills Act or the particular formality.50  Either one complied 
with the plain meaning of the formality in question, or one did not.51  The 
courts focused on compliance, not consequences.52  As the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court explained recently: 
 The frustration of decedent’s apparent testamentary intent by her own 
failure to observe the proper formalities may seem at first a harsh result, 
but it is a result which is required by our Legislature and which this Court 
may not alter.  “The courts must consider that the legislature, having 
regard to all probable circumstances, has thought it best, and has 
therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating the intention 
sometimes, in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the 
formation of spurious wills . . . .” Churchill’s Estate, supra, 260 Pa. at 
101, 103 A. at 535.  “The strictness with which this section of the Wills 
Act must be enforced is a matter of legislative mandate.  As we said in 
Brown Estate, supra, [347 Pa. at 246, 32 A.2d at 23]: ‘The Wills Act 
requires signing at the end.  The purpose of the Act was to remove all 
possibility of fraud . . . . Even if the testamentary intention of this 
particular testatrix is frustrated, it is much wiser to refrain from 
weakening the sound and well established mandate of the legislature.  
Were we to do so, we might in future cases facilitate fraudulent or 
unauthorized alterations or additions to wills.’” Coyne Will, 349 Pa. 331, 
334, 37 A.2d 509, 510-11 (1944) (emphasis added).  
 In denying the admission of decedent’s will to probate, the auditing 
judge and the orphans’ court en banc obeyed the clear mandate of the 
 
 
And that count does not include the latent issue that has arisen with respect to whether the testator 
must sign the will before the witnesses. 
 47.   See Wendel, Flawed Narrative, supra note 7, at 339. 
 48.   Id. at 340.   
 49.   See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597, 602 
(2014) [hereinafter Glover, Decoupling the Law] (explaining that “any error in will-execution 
invalidates a will, regardless of how minor or technical the formal defect, and despite the court’s 
confidence that the decedent intended the document to constitute a valid will.”) (citing Langbein, 
Substantial Compliance, supra note 3, at 489).   
 50.   Id. at 604.  Further, “[c]ritics argue that this formalism conflicts with the cornerstone of the 
law of wills, which is the principle that testators have broad freedom to dispose of their estates, and 
that the law’s ultimate purpose is to effectuate the testator’s intent to exercise this freedom.”  Id. 
(footnote omitted).   
 51.   Id. at 601–02.   
 52.   See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.   
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Legislature.  This Court can do no less.53 
Under the traditional strict compliance approach, if anyone’s intent 
matters it is that of the legislature, not the testator: 
The primary rule governing the interpretation of wills recognizes and 
endeavors to carry out the intention of the testator.  This applies, 
however, after the will has been admitted to probate, and the rule cannot 
be invoked in the construction of the statute regulating its execution.  In 
the latter case courts do not consider the intention of the testator, but that 
of the Legislature.  The question is not what did the testator intend to do, 
but what has he done in the light of the statute.54 
Justice Scalia would have been pleased.55 
Bottom line, under the traditional approach, whether a document 
qualifies as a valid will is a function of (1) a Wills Act with a plethora of 
formalities, and (2) a judiciary that favors a textual, plain meaning 
approach to the Act—devoid of any concern for consequences.56 
IV. THE INTENT APPROACH TO THE WILLS ACT FORMALITIES 
A.  The Traditional Approach’s Reign 
This traditional approach to the Wills Act reigned supreme, 
unchallenged, from the adoption of the English Statute of Fraud in 1677 
until the middle of the twentieth century.57  In the 1930’s, a number of 
states started to revise their probate codes.58  Professor Atkinson, one of 
the leading Wills, Trusts & Estates scholars at the time, suggested it might 
make more sense to have a model probate code that each state could use 
as the starting point when revising their codes.59  The result was the Model 
 
 53.   In re Estate of Proley, 422 A.2d 136, 138–39 (Pa. 1980) (emphasis in the original) (citations 
omitted). 
 54.   In re Estate of Snyder, 277 N.Y.S. 577, 578 (Surr. Ct. 1935). 
 55.   See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist Ideal, 85 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (2017) (highlighting Justice Scalia’s textualist approach and his ideal that 
the text is the law).  See also Glover, Decoupling the Law, supra note 49, at 602–04 (providing an 
example of a court disregarding clear testator intent in ruling a will invalid).  
 56.   See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 57.   See Glover, Decoupling the Law, supra note 49, at 607–08 (explaining the modern trend 
reform movement’s attempt to encapsulate its principles in the 1969 Uniform Probate Code); see also 
infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.  
 58.   See generally Thomas E. Atkinson, Old Principles and New Ideas Concerning Probate 
Court Procedure, 23 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 137 (1939).  
 59.   Thomas E. Atkinson, Wanted—A Model Probate Code, 23 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 183, 189–90 
(1940).  Professor Atkinson noted that new probate codes were enacted by several states, such as Ohio 
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Probate Code of 1946.60 
The Model Probate Code evidences the widespread support for the 
traditional approach to the Wills Act.  Though phrased differently, 
substantively the Code’s Wills Act is almost identical to that of the English 
Wills Act of 1837.61  Moreover, the Model Probate Code accompanied a 
larger report entitled Problems in Probate Law.62  Nowhere in that report, 
or in either of Professor Atkinson’s articles calling for the creation of a 
model probate code, is there even a hint of criticism or concern with the 
traditional approach to the Wills Act.63 
B. The Attack on the Traditional Approach to the Wills Act Formalities 
The first direct attack on the traditional approach to the Wills Act is 
Professor Mechem’s 1948 article entitled Why Not a Modern Wills Act?64  
 
in 1931, Florida in 1933, Minnesota in 1935, and Illinois, Kansas, and Michigan in 1939.  Id. at  189 
n.55.  The Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association took up 
Professor Atkinson’s suggestion, joined forces with the University of Michigan, and the result was the 
Model Probate Code.  See R. G. Patton, Improvement of Probate Statutes—The Model Code, 39 IOWA 
L. REV. 446, 449–51 (1954) (describing the extensive research and drafting process of the 1946 Code 
involving Professor Atkinson, Professor Simes, the American Bar Association, and the University of 
Michigan).   
 60.   See LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, Model Probate Code, in PROBLEMS IN PROBATE 
LAW 1, at 1–238 (1946). 
 61.   See SIMES & BASYE, supra note 60, at 81–82.  Compared to the English Wills Act of 1837, 
the model Wills Act does not require either the testator or the witnesses to sign at the end of the will, 
but otherwise it (a) includes all of the other formalities, and (b) expressly adds the requirement that 
the testator signify to the witnesses that the document is his or her will.  Id.  Some sections of the 
Model Probate Code have Comments explaining the logic behind the section.  See, e.g., id. at 83.  
There is no comment to Section 47, Wills Execution.  Id. at 81–82.  
 62.   See SIMES & BASYE, supra note 60, at 239–56.   
 63.   The primary focus of the Model Probate Code appears to have been on the judicial 
organization and procedures of the probate process.  See SIMES & BASYE, supra note 60, at 9.  It would 
be wrong, however, to assume that the drafters did not critically evaluate the then prevailing traditional 
approach to the Wills Act.  As the Chairman of the drafting committee states in the concluding 
paragraph of the “Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Model Probate Code:” 
 
  In presenting this Code as the product of five years of preparation and unremitting toil, 
it is believed that the viewpoint of no important social group has been overlooked and that 
the content of every important probate statute now on the books has been considered.  It 
would be too much to say that the Code is free from all imperfection.  Yet in presenting it 
to the Section in its final form, it is the belief of your Committee that either as a code 
complete in itself, or as a fundamental probate law on which to build a larger legislative 
superstructure, it can be recommended without qualification to the legislative authorities 
of any jurisdiction in which probate reform is sought.  
 
SIMES & BASYE, supra note 60, at 8 (emphasis added).  When the Model Probate Code was drafted in 
the mid-1940’s, there appears to have been a general consensus that the traditional approach to the 
Wills Act formalities was the best approach. 
 64.   See Philip Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501 (1948).  One can 
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While acknowledging the good work done by the drafters of the Model 
Probate Code generally, Professor Mechem took them to task for their 
poor effort with respect to the model Wills Act: 
A reviewer [of the Model Probate Code] speaks of the “fairness, the 
imagination, the resourcefulness and the restrained audacity of the 
draftsmen.”  That is strong talk but probably few would cavil at it.  The 
writer, however, is a little disturbed by one portion of the Code, small 
but of great importance, namely, the provisions relating to the execution, 
revocation, and operation of wills.  The draftsmen here seem to the writer 
to have displayed anything but imagination, resourcefulness, or audacity, 
restrained or otherwise.  On the contrary, these provisions seem to him 
almost incredibly reactionary, unimaginative, and timid.  The Statute of 
Frauds was passed in 1677.  One is asked to think either that that famous 
enactment was so perfect as to need no improvement or that the framers 
of the Code have learned nothing from the experience of the intervening 
270 years.65 
Professor Mechem then took aim at the Wills Act formalities: “the 
philosophy should be to impose only such requirements as seem so 
unmistakably essential to a safe will-making process as to justify running 
the known risk of defeating meritorious wills through failure of testators 
to know or comply with the requirements.”66  While acknowledging the 
benefits of the core formalities, Professor Mechem questioned the value 
of most of the ancillary formalities.67  His proposed model Wills Act,68 
 
argue that the seminal 1941 law review article by Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous 
Transfers, supra note 9, constitutes the first attack on the traditional approach to the Wills Act, and to 
a degree that would be accurate.  As part of the article’s analysis of gratuitous transfers generally, it 
examines the Wills Act formalities and questions the value of several of the ancillary formalities.  Id. 
at 5–14.  The article does not, however, propose any specific revisions to the Wills Act.  It focuses on 
the legal consequences of classifying a gratuitous transfer as one type or another (will, gift, trust, or 
contract) and advocates for a flexible approach to classifying gratuitous transfers to ensure that the 
transfer is given effect where the functions underlying the doctrinal formalities and the equities 
involved justify it, even if the traditional doctrinal formalities do not.  Id. at 17–18.  Professor 
Mechem’s article, in contrast, directly attacks the traditional approach and offers a different approach 
both philosophically and doctrinally.  See Mechem, supra. 
 65.   Mechem, supra note 64, at 501 (footnote omitted).   
 66.   Id. at 503.  
 67.   Id. at 503–07. 
 68.   Mechem’s assessment of each formality is implicitly reflected in his proposed Wills Act 
based on his minimalistic approach: 
 
§ 46. Execution.  All wills, other than nuncupative or holographic wills, shall be in writing, 
signed by the testator and by two or more attesting witnesses, and shall be executed as 
follows: 
(a) Testator.  Testator’s signature may be made by himself, or by someone for him in his 
presence and by his direction, and his signature shall either be made, or exhibited and 
acknowledged by him, in the presence of each of the witnesses, though not necessarily of 
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which is markedly different from the paradigm traditional Wills Act (i.e., 
the English Wills Act of 1837 and/or the Model Probate Code of 1946), 
eliminates many of the ancillary formalities: neither the testator nor the 
witnesses need sign at the end of the will;69 the witnesses need not be 
present at the same time when the testator signs or acknowledges;70 the 
witnesses need not be present at the same time when they attest the will;71 
the testator need not be present when either of the witnesses attest the 
will;72 and the testator need not publish the will.73  The gauntlet had been 
thrown down.74 
When viewed with the benefit of history, maybe the most surprising 
aspect of Professor Mechem’s article is the academic community’s 
scholarly response to it: there was none.75  In the two decades following 
its publication not a single law review article commented on his minimalist 
approach to the Wills Act formalities.76  In 1962, however, the American 
Bar Association joined forces with the National Conference on Uniform 
Laws to revise the Model Probate Code of 1946.77  The result was the 
 
both at the same time.  
(b) Witnesses.  The witnesses need not sign in the presence of the testator nor of each other, 
but if either or both of them do not sign in the presence of the testator the one or ones not 
so signing shall exhibit his or their signature or signatures to the testator and acknowledge 
the same. 
(c) Publication.  No formal publication nor request to the witnesses to sign shall be 
necessary nor shall it be necessary that the witnesses know the contents of the instrument, 
or that it is a will, but before the will shall be admitted to probate, the trier of fact must be 
satisfied that testator intended the instrument to take effect and that the witnesses knew 
from the statements or conduct of the testator that he intended the instrument to take effect 
and wished them to witness it. 
 
Id. at 507–08. 
 69.   Id. 
 70.   Id. at 508. 
 71.   Id. 
 72.   Id. 
 73.   Id. 
 74.   Professor Mechem explained, “[h]ad the framers of the Code been able to produce a blue 
print for such a procedure it would indeed have marked an epochal advance in the history of probate 
practice, far beyond anything they have actually accomplished, however careful and praiseworthy their 
product may be deemed.”  Id. at 521. 
 75.   Between 1948, when Professor Mechem’s article was published, and 1969, when the 
National Law Commission published the Uniform Probate Code with its model Wills Act, there was 
only one cite to Professor Mechem’s article—and it had to do with the doctrine of ademption, not his 
attack on the traditional Wills Act formalities.  See Ademption and the Testator’s Intent, 74 HARV. L. 
REV. 741, 751 n.58 (1961). 
 76.   See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 77.   See Lawrence H. Averill Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate 
Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 895–96 (1992).  
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Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) of 1969.78  The official Comment to the 
UPC’s Wills Act, Article 2, Part 5, provides in pertinent part: “[E]xecution 
must be kept simple . . . . To this end, . . . formalities for a written and 
attested will are kept to a minimum . . . .”79 
If one were to create a spectrum, with the English Wills Act of 1837 
at one end and Professor Mechem’s proposed Wills Act at the other, the 
UPC’s Wills Act is much closer to Professor Mechem’s proposed Wills 
Act:80 neither the testator nor the witnesses need sign at the end of will; 
the witnesses need not be present at the same time when the testator signs 
or acknowledges; the witnesses need not be present at the same time when 
they attest the will; the testator need not be present when either of the 
witnesses attest the will; and the testator need not publish the will.81  
Although the UPC’s drafting committee never expressly acknowledged 
Professor Mechem’s article, the drafting committee fully embraced and 
implemented his minimalist approach.82 
If the goal of the 1969 UPC’s Wills Act was to draw attention to the 
issue of how many formalities a jurisdiction should have in its Wills Act, 
and to reduce the number of formalities, it has succeeded.  After the 
Uniform Law Revisions Commission promulgated UPC Section 2-502 
(the UPC’s proposed Wills Act), almost every state undertook a similar 
process: critically re-assessing its Wills Act formalities to see if some of 
 
 78.   After six drafts, the two committees finally agreed upon the Uniform Probate Code, the 
official text of which was approved by the National Conference on Uniform Laws and the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1969.  Id. at 896.   
 79.   See UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. 2, pt. 5 General Comment (amended 2019); Mechem, supra note 
64, at 507–08. 
 80.   Section 2-502 [Execution] 
 
  Except as provided for holographic wills, . . .  every will shall be in writing signed by 
the testator or in the testator’s name by some other person in the testator’s presence and by 
his direction, and shall be signed by at least 2 persons each of whom witnessed either the 
signing or the testator’s acknowledgment of the signature or of the will. 
 
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (amended 2019). 
 81.   See id.  Moreover, the UPC’s Wills Act goes further: there is no requirement that if a witness 
does not sign in the testator’s presence that the witness must “exhibit his or their signature or signatures 
to the testator and acknowledge the same.”  Mechem, supra note 64, at 508.  There is no requirement 
“that the witnesses knew from the statements or conduct of the testator that he intended the instrument 
to take effect and wished them to witness it.”  Id.  The UPC also “authorizes holographic wills, and it 
reduces the number of formal requirements for both attested and holographic wills below the minimum 
levels customary in previous American Wills Acts.”  See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra 
note 3, at 510. 
 82.   Notably, the general comment to the Wills section of the UPC explains: “If the will is to be 
restored to its role as the major instrument for disposition of wealth at death, its execution must be 
kept simple.  The basic intent of these sections is to validate the will whenever possible.”  See UNIF. 
PROB. CODE, art. 2, pt. 5 General Comment (amended 2019). 
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the ancillary formalities could be eliminated.83  The end result shows the 
impact of the 1969 UPC Wills Act.  If one were to create a spectrum, with 
the traditional Wills Act patterned on the English Wills Act of 1837 on 
one end, and the UPC Wills Act, Section 2-502, on the other end, the states 
are spread all across the spectrum.  A little over a dozen states have 
retained most of the formalities embodied in traditional Wills Act.84  A 
little over a dozen states have adopted the 1969 UPC’s Wills Act, Section 
2-502.85  The rest of the states, a slight majority, have followed the UPC’s 
lead and revised their Wills Act to significantly reduce the number of 
ancillary formalities, but their formalities differ from the UPC 
formalities.86 
 
 83.  See infra notes 84–85. 
 84.   ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (West, Westlaw through 2020 1st Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
732.502 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2nd Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 2nd Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.279 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-606 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577 (Westlaw through 2019 Sess.) (the Louisiana notarial testament is 
unique, not based on English legal precedent, but in terms of formalities, it is closer to the English 
Wills Act of 1837 than the Uniform Probate Code section 2-502); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-502 (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 2nd Sess.); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 2502 (West, Westlaw through 
2020 Act 78); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-5-5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 79 of 2020 2nd Sess.); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2nd Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5 
(West, Westlaw through Act 150 of 2019–2020 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-403 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-3 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.). 
 85.   ALA. CODE § 43-8-131 (Westlaw through 2020 Act 206); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-
502 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Act 15); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-502 (West, Westlaw through 
2020 2nd Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, § 2-502 (Westlaw through 2019 2nd Sess.); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-502 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 176 of 2020 2nd Sess.); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2502 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2020, No. 164, 2020 Sess.); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 524.2-502 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522 (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2327 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2nd 
Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c. 86); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
30.1-08-02 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 112.235 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502 (Westlaw through 2020 Act 142); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 75-2-502 (West, Westlaw through 2020 6th Sess.).  But see George Holmes, Comment, 
Testamentary Formalism in Louisiana: Curing Notarial Will Defects Through a Likelihood-of-Fraud 
Analysis, 75 LA. L. REV. 511, 520 (2014) (asserting that “roughly 20 states” have adopted “some form” 
of UPC Section 2-502). 
 86.   ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2502 (Westlaw through 2020 2nd Sess.); CAL. PROB. CODE § 
6110 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-502 (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-251 (West, Westlaw through 2020 
Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 202 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 292 of 2019–2020 Sess.); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 18-103 (West, Westlaw through Aug. 14, 2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-20 (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Act 545); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 § 5/4-3 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 
101-651, 2020); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 20, 2020); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.320 (West, 
Westlaw through West ID No. 28 of 2020 Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.040 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 32nd Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:2 (Westlaw through Ch. 39 of 2020 Sess.); 
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney, Westlaw through Ch. 199 of L.2020); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-3.3 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2020-74 of 2020 Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE 
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Although the jurisdictions could not agree on which formalities should 
be eliminated and which should be retained (other than the core 
formalities),87 the fact that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
have revised their Wills Act to reduce significantly the number of ancillary 
formalities shows that at the macro level, many traditionalists concluded 
that the traditional Wills Act modeled on the English Wills Act of 1837 
was outdated and in need of revision.88  Whichever formalities a 
jurisdiction retained, however, it is safe to assume the formality was 
retained because the jurisdiction’s law revision commission determined 
that the formality serves an important function.  Inasmuch as each retained 
formality serves an important function, it is logical to assume that the 
courts should insist on strict compliance with each retained formality.  No 
doubt that is the assumption and logic many traditionalists, and the UPC, 
initially adopted;89 and that reasoning helps to explain the traditionalists 
more tepid response to the more recent proposals by the intent-oriented 
activists.90 
 
ANN. § 2107.03 (West, Westlaw through File 48 of 2019–2020 Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 55 
(West, Westlaw through 2020 2nd Sess.); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 251.051 (West, Westlaw through 
2019 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.020 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 853.03 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-114 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Budget Sess.).  See Holmes, supra note 85, at 520–21. 
 87.   While the three core requirements remain in every state’s Wills Act, there is greater variance 
today between and among the States’ approaches to the ancillary formalities than ever before.  See 
Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting States, 8 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 599, 601–02 (1985).  Many states took a piecemeal approach to the UPC, adopting 
parts of the Wills Act and other sections of the Code with modifications.  Id. at 600–02.  Further, 
regarding the UPC’s Wills Act, Article II has been described as having a “broad but thin appeal” in 
that almost every section had been followed in some states, but no single section could garner the 
support of more than some states.  Id. at 602.  At one end of the spectrum, virtually every state has 
agreed with the Uniform Probate Code that the traditional formality that the testator must publish his 
or her will no longer makes sense and has been abolished.  See Diane J. Klein, How to Do Things with 
Wills, 32 WHITTIER L. REV. 455, 466 n.65 (2011).  At the other end of the spectrum, however, very 
few states have agreed with the Uniform Probate Code that the testator need not sign or acknowledge 
the will in the presence of two witnesses present at the same time.  See Lindgren, supra note 40, at 
549, 571.  Many states refused to abolish this requirement because of its utility in proving the validity 
of a will.  Id.  As for the other formalities the Uniform Probate Code eliminated, the results are more 
mixed, with some states adopting the Uniform Probate Code’s position, and some states sticking with 
the traditional approach.  See generally Andersen, supra.   
 88.   No doubt the traditionalists’ voices were present in the debates within each state over (a) 
which formalities should be eliminated, and (b) which should be retained; and their voices help to 
explain the split in the jurisdictions.  See supra notes 84–86. 
 89.   See James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1992) (describing 
the immediate era after the adoption of UPC Section 2-502, Professor Lindgren acknowledges that 
“[t]he approach of the Uniform Probate Code from 1969 until 1990 was to reduce will formalities, but 
to require strict compliance with those formalities.”); see also Holmes, supra note 85, at 520. 
 90.   See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
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V. THE ATTACK ON THE STRICT COMPLIANCE JUDICIAL APPROACH 
In 1975, Professor John Langbein opened up a second front in the 
attack on the traditional approach to how much formality the law should 
require before giving effect to testamentary intent.91  In his now landmark 
article, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act,92 Professor Langbein 
criticized the courts for requiring “literal compliance” with the Wills Act 
formalities:93 
 The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and relentless formalism.  
The Wills Act prescribes a particular set of formalities for executing 
one’s testament.  The most minute defect in formal compliance is held 
to void the will, no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was 
inconsequential.  Probate courts do not speak of harmless error in the 
execution of wills . . . . [O]nce a formal defect is found, Anglo-American 
courts have been unanimous in concluding that the attempted will fails. 
. . . [T]he insistent formalism of the law of wills is mistaken and 
needless.94 
Professor Langbein’s article pivoted the formality versus intent debate 
from a statutory issue to a judicial issue; from how many formalities the 
Wills Act should have to how the formalities should be construed and 
applied.95 Professor Langbein argued that the traditional, “literal” 
approach needs to give way to a more “purposive” approach.96 
Professor Langbein’s view on what constitutes a more purposive 
approach has changed over time.  Initially he argued for a substantial 
compliance approach—but one that is holistic, rather than formality based.  
If a will failed under strict compliance, the courts should subject the 
document “to a further inquiry: does the noncomplying document express 
the decedent’s testamentary intent, and does its form sufficiently 
approximate Wills Act formality to enable the court to conclude that it 
 
 91.   See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 3, at 489.   
 92.   Id.    
 93.   Id.  Professor Langbein shifted to the more commonly used “strict compliance” term to 
describe the traditional judicial approach to Wills Act compliance in his subsequent article on the 
issue.  See generally John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report 
on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter 
Langbein, Harmless Errors]. 
 94.   Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 3, at 489.   
 95.   Professor Langbein highlighted the peculiarity of “judicial insistence that any defect in 
complying with [the formalities] automatically and inevitably voids the will” when the judiciary shows 
more deference to noncompliant Statute of Frauds transactions.  Id. at 498–99. 
 96.   Langbein argued on this point that “[b]y substituting a purposive analysis for a formal one, 
the substantial compliance doctrine would actually decrease litigation about the formalities.”  Id. at 
526. 
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serves the purposes of the Wills Act?”97  Just over a decade later, Professor 
Langbein revised his view, rejecting substantial compliance (which deems 
compliance despite a flaw in the execution ceremony) in favor of a 
harmless error approach (which empowers the court to validate a will by 
excusing noncompliance).98  So long as there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent intended the document to constitute his or her 
will, the court is empowered to excuse any defect in the execution of the 
will.99  The UPC has adopted Professor Langbein’s harmless error 
approach.100  Empowering courts to probate wills that fail to comply with 
the Wills Act formalities increases the courts’ ability to give effect to 
decedents’ testamentary wishes.101 
The attack on the traditional strict compliance judicial approach has 
not been as successful as the attack on the statutory Wills Act formalities.  
Thirty years after the adoption of Section 2-503 to the Uniform Probate 
Code, only eleven states have revised their Probate Code to include the 
harmless error doctrine102—and several of them have adopted a limited 
form of the harmless error doctrine that limits the formalities to which it 
can be applied (e.g., prohibiting its application to the signature 
requirement).103  Similar to the statutory approach to the Wills Act 
 
 97.   Id. at 489. 
 98.   Langbein, Harmless Errors, supra note 93, at 6–7. 
 99.   Id. 
 100.   The Uniform Probate Code provides in pertinent part: 
 
  Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in 
compliance with Section 2-502 [will execution requirements], the document or writing is 
treated as if it had been executed in compliance with [the execution requirements] if the 
proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the 
decedent intended the document or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will.   
 
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (amended 2019). 
 101.   See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 102.   See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Sess.); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-503 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-
503 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Act 15); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2503 (West, Westlaw 
through P.A.2020, No. 164, 2020 Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (West, Westlaw through the 
2019 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c. 86); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2107.24 (West, Westlaw through File 48 of 2019–2020 Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.238 
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (Westlaw through 2020 
Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (West, Westlaw through 2020 6th Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-
404 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.). 
 103.   See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Sess.) (limiting 
the harmless error doctrine to execution defects related to the witnessing requirements and not 
permitting it to be applied to defects related to the signature requirement); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
15-11-503(2) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.) (limiting Colorado’s harmless error doctrine to 
documents “signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear 
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formalities, there is greater variance between and among the states’ 
judicial approach to the Wills Act formalities than ever before. 
VI. THE POWER TO REFORM AN UNAMBIGUOUS WILL 
A.  The Traditional Approach: Construe Only 
Lastly, an issue that has long troubled the courts is, assuming a validly 
executed will, how open to extrinsic evidence should the courts be to help 
give effect to testator’s intent.  Under the older traditional approach, the 
courts applied the plain meaning rule and would admit extrinsic evidence 
only if there was a latent ambiguity in the will.104  Most courts today, 
however, admit extrinsic evidence to help the court construe the will 
anytime there is an ambiguity—whether it be a latent or patent 
ambiguity.105  While courts have become increasingly open to extrinsic 
evidence to help construe an ambiguity in the will, most courts have 
attempted to hold the line on re-writing a will.  These courts still follow 
the traditional view that it is one thing to construe an ambiguity in a will; 
it is another to re-write an unambiguous will.106  The reasons given for 
drawing that line resonate with those who favor the more traditional 
approach to testamentary formalities: 
 
and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of 
the decedent’s spouse.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404(B) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.) 
(providing that Virginia’s harmless error doctrine “may not be used to excuse compliance with any 
requirement for a testator’s signature,” except in very limited, statutorily defined circumstances). 
 104.   See Ann E. Breuer, Note, Pellegrini v. Breitenbach and Courts’ Reluctant Power to Reform 
Innocent Mistakes in Wills, 26 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 46, 51–52 (2012).  Under this approach, the 
courts would not admit extrinsic evidence if there was a patent ambiguity, and in analyzing whether 
there was an ambiguity the courts applied the plain meaning rule—the words in the will should be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning.  E.g., Winet v. Price, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1165 (1992); 
Pihlajamaa v. Kaihlan (In re Estate of Kaila), 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 872–74 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 105.   See Breuer, supra note 104, at 52.  And in determining whether the will contains an 
ambiguity, many courts have rejected the plain meaning rule.  See generally Andrea W. Cornelison, 
Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL 
PROP. PROB & TR. J. 811 (2001) (discussing the plain meaning rule and analyzing the ways courts 
have begun to reject it).  Uniform Probate Code § 2-502(c) permits extrinsic evidence to establish 
testamentary intent, thereby abandoning the hoary “four-corners” rule that required the testator’s intent 
to be determined within the four corners of the document—a rule that, in any event, was more a 
statement of an ideal.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(c) (amended 2019).  Moreover, in analyzing whether 
the will contains an ambiguity, the courts should take into consideration the circumstances surrounding 
the testator at time of execution and analyze the wording in the will in light of those circumstances in 
assessing whether the will contains an ambiguity.  Cornelison, supra at 819–24, 828–32. 
 106.   Cornelison, supra note 105, at 817 (“The no-reformation rule says that courts shall not 
change the language of a will or give effect to language not contained in a will because ‘the objection 
arises that the language to be supplied was not written, signed, and attested as required by the Wills 
Act.’”) (quoting Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 4, at 528); see also Mark 
Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 569, 601–02 (2016) [hereinafter 
Glover, A Taxonomy of Intent]. 
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[T]he reformation of a will, which would dispose of estate property 
based on unattested testamentary language, would violate the Statute of 
Wills. Strong policy reasons also militate against the requested 
reformation.  To allow for reformation in this case would open the 
floodgates of litigation and lead to untold confusion in the probate of 
wills.  It would essentially invite disgruntled individuals excluded from 
a will to demonstrate extrinsic evidence of the decedent’s “intent” to 
include them.  The number of groundless will contests could soar.  We 
disagree that employing “full, clear and decisive proof” as the standard 
for reformation of wills would suffice to remedy such problems . . . .  
Judicial resources are simply too scarce to squander on such 
consequences.107 
B.  Modern Trend: Power to Reform an Unambiguous Will 
The testamentary intent movement takes issue with the traditional 
distinction between construing and re-writing a will.  The intent approach 
believes testamentary intent should be given effect anytime there is 
adequate evidence of that intent.108  If clear and convincing evidence is 
sufficient to validate an improperly executed will, clear and convincing 
evidence should be sufficient to reform a poorly drafted will.109  Professor 
Langbein made that point near the end of his article proposing the harmless 
error approach for mistakes in the execution of a will: 
 The development of a statutory remedy to cure mistakes in complying 
with execution formalities invites consideration of the parallel . . . 
problem of mistakes in content.  When a typist drops a paragraph, or a 
lawyer misdescribes a devisee, the law should be prepared to correct the 
error if the error can be proved according to the same clear and 
convincing standard of proof that applies when such mistakes arise in the 
law of will substitutes.  In the law of wills, both the traditional refusal to 
excuse innocuous execution errors and the traditional refusal to correct 
obvious mistakes in content, result from the same theoretical excess— 
overvaluing the requirements of Wills Act formality.110 
In 2008, the Uniform Law Commission adopted Professor Langbein’s 
proposal for granting the courts the power to reform an unambiguous 
will.111  The Uniform Probate Code empowers a court to reform an 
unambiguous will so long as there is clear and convincing evidence (a) 
 
 107.   Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Mass. 2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 108.   See, e.g., Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 4, at 522–23 (explaining 
the benefits of reforming wills when there is sufficient evidence of intent and arguing that “the time 
has come for forthright judicial reconsideration of the no-reformation rule.”).  
 109.   Id. at 576–77. 
 110.   Langbein, Harmless Errors, supra note 93, at 53 (footnotes omitted).  
 111.   See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-805 (amended 2019); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. L. INST. 2003). 
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that the terms of the will were affected by a mistake, and (b) of the 
decedent’s true intent.112  So long as there is clear and convincing evidence 
of the decedent’s true intent, the courts have the power to use extrinsic 
evidence to reform the will so that it better expresses the testator’s 
testamentary intent.113 
VII.THE CRUX OF THE DISPUTE 
Despite the nomenclature assigned to the two camps, both the 
traditional approach and the intent movement agree that testamentary 
intent is important, and all things being equal, it is better to give effect to 
a decedent’s testamentary intent than not.114  The debate is over whether 
the intent movement’s proposals are really an improvement over a more 
traditional approach to the issues.115  Both camps agree that the benefit of 
 
 112.   Uniform Probate Code § 2-805 states: 
 
  The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument, even if unambiguous, to 
conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing 
evidence what the transferor’s intention was and that the terms of the governing instrument 
were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement. 
 
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-805 (amended 2019).  Granting courts the power to reform an unambiguous 
will is a logical extension of the position first articulated by Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of 
Gratuitous Transfers, supra note 9.  Relatively early in the article they assert, in surprisingly simple 
and straightforward phrasing, what one can only assume was a radical statement in light of the 
traditional, and then prevailing, view of the law of inter vivos and testamentary transfers: 
 
  One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the 
individualistic institution of private property and granting to the owner the power to 
determine his successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should favor 
giving effect to an intentional exercise of that power.  This is commonplace enough, but it 
needs constant emphasis, for it may [be] obscured or neglected in inordinate preoccupation 
with detail or dialectic.  A court absorbed in purely doctrinal arguments may lose sight of 
the important and desirable objective of sanctioning what the transferor wanted to do, even 
though it is convinced that he wanted to do it. 
 
  If this objective is primary, the requirements of execution, which concern only the form 
of the transfer—what the transferor or others must do to make it legally effective—seem 
justifiable only as implements for its accomplishment, and should be so interpreted by the 
courts in these cases.  They surely should not be revered as ends in themselves, enthroning 
formality over frustrated intent. 
 
Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  There it is: an articulation of the formality versus 
intent tension that is inherent in every Wills Act, and the first scholarly assertion that intent should 
prevail over formalities.  The intent movement has not only adopted that position but extended it to 
include reforming unambiguous wills to ensure that formality does not frustrate intent. 
 113.   UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-903 (amended 2019). 
 114.   See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 115.   See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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the intent movement’s harmless error and power-to-reform doctrines is 
that they will result in more wills being probated and more testamentary 
transfers being given effect.116  Where the two camps disagree is with 
respect to (a) the magnitude of the benefits and (b) the magnitude of the 
costs associated with the harmless error and power-to-reform doctrines.117  
Opponents of the harmless error and power-to-reform doctrines are 
particularly concerned with the increased costs of administration and the 
increased potential for fraud inherent in both doctrines.118 
The debate over the cost-benefit analysis of the modern trend doctrines 
raises difficult questions of how to calculate the values inherent in the 
analysis. How often are intended wills invalidated under strict 
compliance?119  What is the cost associated with failing to give effect to a 
decedent’s apparent testamentary intent?  Is testamentary intent an abstract 
 
 116.   Glover, A Taxonomy of Intent, supra note 106, at 600–04 (arguing that while harmless error 
and power-to-reform permit the courts to give greater effect to testamentary intent, they will inherently 
also introduce greater uncertainty into the respective areas of law because of the subjective, fact 
sensitive nature of the inquiry and analysis); see also Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error, supra note 
13, at 389; Wendel, Flawed Narrative, supra note 7, at 396; Gökalp Y. Gürer, Note, No Paper? No 
Problem: Ushering in Electronic Wills Through California’s “Harmless Error” Provision, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1955, 1965–66 (2016).  But see, Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary 
Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 238, 241 (1996): 
 
[T]here is no reason to believe that the dispensing power and other reforms will result in  
substantially greater judicial commitment to testamentary intent.  Rather, the loosening of  
formalities will simply lead courts to use different pretexts for imposing their moral order.  
 
. . . .  
 
  Nevertheless, the reformers have sought to minimize both formalities and formalism to 
increase the effectuation of intent. 
 
Id. 
 117.   See, e.g., Mechem, supra note 64, at 501–02; Glover, Decoupling the Law, supra note 49, 
at 607–08.  
 118.   Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 829 (2014) (“The harmless error power might tend to encourage 
carelessness and breed litigation, or open up avenues for fraud.”) (footnote omitted); see also In re 
Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1345 (N.J. 1991) (“Our adoption of the doctrine of substantial 
compliance should not be construed as an invitation either to carelessness or chicanery.”).  The Court’s 
statement that substantial compliance is not an “invitation” to carelessness is an implicit 
acknowledgment that it is a likely risk, the question is just how much of a risk.  See also, Langbein, 
Harmless Errors, supra note 93, at 4–5, 37 (acknowledging that one of the principal arguments against 
the harmless error approach is that it “would invite excessive and difficult litigation.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 119.   See Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error, supra note 13, at 343 (“Case after case reveals that 
well-meaning decedents often intend to execute valid wills but fail to comply with the prescribed 
formalities because of honest mistakes.”  But no attempt is made to calculate how many—or how 
often—such intended wills are actually invalidated under strict compliance, as such data is 
incalculable) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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good that should be valued, in and of itself, the same for all individuals; or 
does it depend on the value of the property that is being transferred (or not 
being transferred, as the case may be)?  On the other hand, what are the 
increased costs of administration associated with the harmless error and 
power-to-reform doctrines?120  How much increased fraudulent behavior 
will there be?121  What is the cost associated with giving effect to 
fraudulent testamentary intent?  Is giving effect to fraudulent testamentary 
intent the same or more costly than failing to give effect to testamentary 
intent?122  How many incidents of fraudulent testamentary intent will go 
undetected? 
The traditionalists tend to (a) discount the marginal benefits associated 
with harmless error and power-to-reform doctrines, and (b) increase and 
emphasize the marginal costs associated with the proposals.123  The intent 
advocates, on the other hand, tend to (a) discount the marginal costs 
associated with these doctrines,124 and (b) increase and emphasize the 
 
 120.   See Kevin Bennardo & Mark Glover, The Location of Holographic Wills, 97 N.C. L. REV. 
1625, 1650 (2019).  Professors Bennardo and Glover implicitly recognize that the modern trend intent 
movement will, at a minimum, increase transaction costs:  
 
Moreover, when it comes to the testator’s compliance with external formalities, a 
presumption of testamentary intent is triggered if the testator complied, or a presumption 
of the lack of testamentary intent is triggered if the testator failed to comply.  These 
presumptions end the will authentication process in most cases, which in turn limits the 
costs of litigating the issue of intent.  
 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See also Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
285, 296 (2017) (“By calling on courts to judge a testator’s volitional state of mind, we would impose 
on courts an evidentiary burden that raises their decision costs. By barring such evidence, we would 
lessen those costs.”); see also Sherwin, supra note 3, at 469: 
 
There remains a possibility that over a longer period, judicial leniency toward non-standard 
testamentary transactions might tempt some lawyers to cut corners and some testators to 
avoid the expense and embarrassment of lawyers.  At a minimum, the mystique 
surrounding wills, which leads most lay people to believe that a will is a solemn transaction 
in which they should seek legal assistance, could eventually disappear. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted).  But see Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 3, 524–26 (arguing that 
substantial compliance will have little, if any, effect on the amount of probate litigation). 
 121.   Some practitioners assert that academics tend to miscalculate how cheap and easy it is to 
commit fraud and how hard and expensive it is to prove fraud.  See Pamela Bucy Pierson & Benjamin 
Patterson Bucy, Trade Fraud: The Wild, New Frontier of White Collar Crime, 19 OR. REV. INT’L L. 
1, 8–10 (2018) (commenting on trade fraud); J. Scott Dutcher, Comments and Note, From the 
Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications for Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and 
Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1295, 1299 (2005) (“[F]raud and other white-collar and corporate 
crimes are easy to commit and unfortunately hard to detect after the fact.”) (footnote omitted). 
 122.   See infra notes 195–97 and accompanying text. 
 123.   See, e.g., Mechem, supra note 64, at 501–02. 
 124.   See Langbein, Harmless Errors, supra note 93, at 51:  
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marginal benefits associated with the proposals.125 
Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of scholars on both sides of the 
issue, it is impossible to calculate with any certainty the actual costs and 
benefits associated with the doctrines.  Reasonable parties will continue to 
respectfully disagree for the foreseeable future.  Both sides seem to be 
settling in, with little apparent chance for much movement.  That was 
pretty much my conclusion until two recent developments in California 
gave me cause to reconsider—and change—my position, sort of. 
VIII.THE RECENT CALIFORNIA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  The Caspary Case 
The first development was a recent case out of Northern California, 
the Caspary case.126  The opinion is unpublished, but Professor David 
Horton eloquently recites the facts in the opening paragraphs of his article, 
Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence from California, he recites: 
 Gerard Caspary was born in 1929 in a prosperous Jewish 
neighborhood in Frankfurt, Germany.  When Caspary was four years old, 
Hitler came to power, and the Caspary family fled to Paris.  In 1940, “the 
Nazis invaded the city.”  Caspary’s parents were sent to Auschwitz, 
where they were killed.  Caspary eluded capture and for three years lived 
underground in South France. 
 When the war ended, Caspary immigrated to America.  He attended 
Swarthmore and Harvard, won a Guggenheim Fellowship, and became 
a beloved medieval history professor at the University of California, 
Berkeley.  Yet as he aged, he increasingly felt compelled to examine his 
own dark past.  Shortly before he retired, he began to teach an 
undergraduate seminar on the Holocaust.  He also wrote a book that 
combined his childhood memories with translations of his family’s 
 
 
  A properly conceived harmless error rule actually decreases litigation about Wills Act 
formalities, although hard cases that require judicial resolution must inevitably arise.  A 
harmless error rule suppresses litigation about technicalities of compliance, since the court 
will excuse errors anyhow; and the rule subjects whatever litigation still arises to a 
purposive standard more predictable than the intrinsically arbitrary formalism of the rule 
of strict compliance.  
 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 125.   See Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 4, at 562–64 (discussing the 
court’s hesitation to allow extrinsic evidence to reform the will in Snide v. Johnson (In re Snide), 418 
N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1981), and refuting the argument that giving courts the power to reform will open 
the door to “countless fraudulent claims” that are currently barred by the Wills Act).  
 126.   Estate of Caspary, No. RP08396884 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 7, 2008). 
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wartime letters. 
 In the spring of 2005, Caspary scheduled a meeting with an estate 
planner. On May 25, the day before the appointment, Caspary typewrote 
a one-page document entitled “Last Will.”  In it, Caspary named two 
executors and expressed his desire to leave $10,000 to his godson, 
$5,000 to his housekeeper, and the “[b]ulk of [his] estate” to the 
Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C.  However, other portions of the 
writing seemed tentative, such as the directive that the “[e]xecutors [are] 
to receive 5% (?) of [the] estate from the top.”  In shaky handwriting at 
the foot of the page, Caspary added his name, address, phone number, 
and email. 
 On May 26, Caspary met with the estate planner.  Caspary mentioned 
his experiences in France during the war.  He also said that because he 
was unmarried, childless, and had no close family, he wanted to leave 
most of his estate to the Holocaust Museum in honor of his parents.  After 
the appointment, the attorney prepared a draft estate plan for Caspary 
and contacted Caspary several times to set a date to execute it.  Despite 
these attempts, Caspary never responded.  On April 6, 2008, Caspary 
died.127 
Professor Horton’s article supports adoption of the harmless error 
doctrine,128 but even factoring that into his writing, he presents a pretty 
compelling case. Professor Horton acknowledges that under the 
traditional, strict compliance approach, “Caspary had failed to make a 
valid will.”129  While Caspary’s case was pending, however, California 
adopted a limited form of the UPC harmless error doctrine.130  It had 
immediate consequences: “A distant relative filed a petition asking the 
court to admit the May 25 writing to probate.  Three of Caspary’s friends 
filed declarations asserting that the typewritten page set forth Caspary’s 
wishes.  The case proceeded to trial and then settled, giving the Holocaust 
Museum a share of the estate.”131 
The Caspary case caused me to seriously reconsider my leanings in 
favor of the traditional approach.  Caspary’s case highlights the principal 
argument in favor of the harmless error doctrine: insisting on strict 
compliance with statutory formalities exalts formalities over intent and 
leads to “unjust enrichment of unintended” heirs.132  One cannot help but 
 
 127.   David Horton, Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence from California, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. 2027, 2028–31 (2018) (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 128.   Id. at 2033–34. 
 129.   Id. at 2031. 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Id. at 2032 (footnotes omitted). 
 132.   Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law, 73 WASH. & LEE L. 
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feel that giving Caspary’s estate to his distant relatives in Europe, with 
whom he had little contact, would have been an unjust result.  All of the 
available evidence—Caspary’s life experiences in escaping the Holocaust, 
but losing his parents to it, and the increasing role that experience came to 
play in his life as he grew older; his teachings and his writings; the fact 
that he had no family in the United States and he was not close to his 
relatives back in Europe; and his express statements to friends and his 
attorney—support the conclusion that, at least at one point in time, his 
apparent testamentary intent was he wanted to leave the bulk of his estate 
to the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. and little to nothing to his 
heirs.133  Why he did not return to the attorney’s office to execute the will 
that was prepared for him is a mystery, but his apparent testamentary intent 
is not.  Yet applying strict compliance to his case would contradict all the 
available evidence concerning his intent, thereby arguably unjustly 
enriching his heirs. 
I confess that one concern I have with the harmless error doctrine is 
that in at least some of the cases the analysis de facto deteriorates into a 
probable intent analysis.  That is what I found myself doing in the Caspary 
case.  The law provides the court with only two options: intestacy, or his 
apparent testamentary intent—“apparent” because he failed to execute a 
valid will.134  Presented with only two options, it is natural to ask which 
one is more likely the decedent’s probable intent?  Technically, that is not 
supposed to be relevant under the harmless error doctrine.135  The intestate 
scheme is the default outcome unless there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent intended the document to be his last will and 
testament.136  That standard, however, is easy to manipulate to support 
whatever conclusion one reaches.  A court can easily reverse engineer an 
opinion to support the conclusion it favors. 
In that sense, one can legitimately ask whether the harmless error 
doctrine is essentially a step “forward to the past.”  It harkens back to 
Professor Bonfield’s description of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury 
and its analysis of medieval wills: 
[J]udges in the Prerogative Court [of Canterbury] in the early modern 
period [the seventeenth century] admitted wills to probate even in 
 
REV. 3, 11 (2016) (“[W]ith respect to Wills Act formalities, it is not clear that courts have authority to 
deviate from legislatively specified will execution requirements.  On the other hand, the strict 
compliance approach does nothing to further wills law’s objective of furthering freedom of 
disposition.  And it allows much unjust enrichment of unintended beneficiaries.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 133.   Horton, supra note 127, at 2028–29. 
 134.   See Mann, supra note 42, at 1048–49. 
 135.   See also infra notes 141, 169 and accompanying text. 
 136.   Mann, supra note 42, at 1048–49. 
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instances in which it was doubtful that a will conformed to church court 
law’s own minimal due-execution requirements.  They did so in the same 
way as does the modern judge: they created a narrative of what had 
actually transpired by sifting through the evidence, and then they 
surmised as to whether the will-maker intended the document to be his 
or her last will.  If they believed that it did, they ignored the defect and 
proved the will; if they did not, they proclaimed it a nullity.137 
There is little dispute that the harmless error doctrine, by granting the 
courts the power to dispense with virtually any and all formalities so long 
as there is clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the 
document to be his or her will, grants the courts greater discretion over 
whether a document qualifies as a validly executed will.  Moreover, even 
what constitutes “testamentary intent” is a fungible test.138  Does it mean 
that the decedent intended that piece of paper be taken down and probated 
as the decedent’s last will and testament, or does it simply mean the 
document, though not intended to be probated as the decedent’s last will 
and testament, adequately expresses the decedent’s final wishes with 
respect to who should get his or her property when he or she dies?139 
Presented with only two options—intestacy or giving the bulk of 
Caspary’s property to the Holocaust Museum—the equities strongly favor 
the Holocaust Museum.  In light of all the evidence, giving his estate to 
the Holocaust Museum is more likely his probable intent.  This logic, 
however, worries me.  Will the harmless error doctrine “evolve”140 into a 
de facto probable intent doctrine?141  Moreover, are the harmless error and 
power-to-reform doctrines nothing more than an attempt to introduce more 
of a “standards” approach into an area of law that historically has been too 
 
 137.   BONFIELD, DEVISING, DYING AND DISPUTE, supra note 27, at 133. 
 138.   See generally Baron, supra note 132 (discussing the various ways that courts have 
interpreted the clear and convincing standard for wills). 
 139.   See generally Glover, A Taxonomy of Intent, supra note 106; Katheleen R. Guzman, Intents 
and Purposes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 305 (2011); David Horton, Wills Without Signatures, 99 B.U. L. 
REV. 1623, 1640–47 (2019) (arguing that courts should probate an unsigned document so long as the 
document has “general testamentary intent” (identified the posthumous destination of the party’s 
property) as opposed to requiring “specific testamentary intent” (the decedent intended the document 
in question to be taken down and probated as the individual’s last will and testament)). 
 140.   Or should I say “deteriorate” . . . ? 
 141.   There is some evidence that the holographic will doctrine has deteriorated similarly.  See 
generally Zhao v. Wong (In re Estate of Wong), 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707, 708–09 (Ct. App. 1995) (where 
the court held a questionable document did not qualify as a holographic will, after noting the following: 
“Meanwhile, Xi [the sole beneficiary under the purported apparent will] was having dinner with Brien 
Wilson at a fancy French restaurant in Los Gatos.  She had concealed from Tai [the decedent] the fact 
that she was dining on New Year’s Eve with Brien Wilson, a man she moved in with two and one-half 
months after Tai’s death.”).  See also Cox v. Towle (In re Estate of Williams), 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34 (Ct. 
App. 2007). 
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“law” oriented?142  And if so, is that necessarily a bad development? 
 On the other hand, strict compliance—and the intestate scheme—is 
not concerned with a decedent’s probable intent, nor is it concerned with 
decedent’s actual intent for that matter unless it is properly expressed.143  
Strict compliance is concerned with the legislature’s intent in adopting the 
Wills Act formalities and applying those formalities to the facts before 
it.144  Under strict compliance, the evidence supporting the argument that 
Caspary’s apparent testamentary intent was to leave the bulk of his estate 
to the Holocaust Museum to honor his parents is irrelevant.  As one who 
generally favors the traditional strict compliance approach, applying strict 
compliance in the Caspary case leaves a bad taste in my mouth. 
B.  The Estate of Duke Case 
If the Caspary case was a body blow to my belief in the traditional 
approach to how much formality the law should require before giving 
effect to a testamentary transfer, the California Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Estate of Duke145 was a potential knock-out.  In 1984, Irving Duke (who 
was then 72 years old) wrote a holographic will that left all of his estate to 
his “‘beloved wife, Mrs. Beatrice Schecter Duke,’ who was then 58 years” 
old and “[o]ne dollar” to his brother, Harry Duke.146  The will went on to 
provide that, in the event Irving and his wife should die at the same 
moment: 
[M]y estate is to be equally divided—[¶] One-half is to be donated to the 
City of Hope in the name and loving memory of my sister, Mrs. Rose 
Duke Radin.  [¶] One-half is to be donated to the Jewish National Fund 
to plant trees in Israel in the names and loving memory of my mother 
and father—[¶] Bessie and Isaac Duke.147 
The will included a standard disinheritance clause.148 
 
 142.   See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
 143.   Langbein, Harmless Errors, supra note 93, at 2–5.  
 144.   Id. 
 145.   Radin v. Jewish Nat’l Fund (In re Estate of Duke), 352 P.3d 863 (Cal. 2015). 
 146.   Id. at 865.  
 147.   Id. (alterations in original). 
 148.   The clause provided: 
 
“I have intentionally omitted all other persons, whether heirs or otherwise, who are not 
specifically mentioned herein, and I hereby specifically disinherit all persons whomsoever 
claiming to be, or who may lawfully be determined to be my heirs at law, except as 
otherwise mentioned in this will. If any heir, devisee or legatee, or any other person or 
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Because of the age difference between the two of them, apparently 
Irving could not conceive of a scenario where Beatrice would predecease 
him, but in fact that is what happened.  Beatrice died in July of 2002.149  
Irving made no changes to his will following her death.150  He died a little 
over 5 years later, in November of 2007.151  Robert and Seymour Radin, 
the children of Irving’s predeceased sister Rose, claimed all of Irving’s 
estate on the grounds that his will failed to address what should happen to 
his estate if Beatrice predeceased him, so the estate passed through 
intestacy to them as his only heirs.152  The City of Hope and the Jewish 
National Fund offered extrinsic evidence which they claimed proved that 
it was Irving’s intent that the will would control even in the event Beatrice 
died before him.153  The lower courts refused to consider the extrinsic 
evidence because there was no ambiguity in the will permitting admission 
of extrinsic evidence with respect to testamentary intent not expressed in 
the will.154  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Robert 
and Seymour.155  The court of appeals affirmed.156  The California 
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that “the categorical bar on reformation of 
unambiguous wills is not justified and that reformation is permissible if 
clear and convincing evidence establishes an error in the expression of the 
testator’s intent and establishes the testator’s actual specific intent at the 
time the will was drafted.”157 
Although the equities are not quite as strong as they are in the Caspary 
case, the equities of the Duke case again had me reconsidering my 
longstanding preference for the more traditional approach to how much 
formality the law should require before giving effect to a testamentary 
transfer.  Irving had handwritten his will, clearly expressing his intent that 
he did not want any family members other than his wife to take his 
estate.158  He left his brother Harry the token gift of “[o]ne dollar,” no 
doubt to indicate that his failure to provide for his brother was not an 
 
persons, shall either directly or indirectly, seek to invalidate this will, or any part thereof, 
then I hereby give and bequeath to such person or persons the sum of one dollar ($1.00) 
and no more, in lieu of any other share or interest in my estate.”  
 
Id. at 865–66.  
 149.   Id. at 866. 
 150.   Id.  
 151.   Id.  
 152.   Id.  
 153.   Id.  
 154.   Id.  
 155.   Id. 
 156.   Id. 
 157.   Id. at 867 (footnote omitted).  
 158.   Id. at 865–66.  
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oversight.159  He included a standard disinheritance clause with respect to 
any and all other heirs who might assert a claim.160  His primary intent was 
to care for his wife, but in the event that was not necessary (if they died 
together), he wanted his estate to go to charity to honor his parents.161 
As applied to the facts of the Duke case, insisting on application of the 
traditional approach to when extrinsic evidence is admissible to help 
“construe” a will–to help give effect to testamentary gifts that are ‘poorly’ 
drafted–would arguably exalt form over substance, formalities over intent, 
and lead to unjust enrichment of unintended heirs.162  All the available 
evidence supports the conclusion that Irving considered his family 
situation when writing his will and concluded that the only person he 
wished to leave any meaningful gift to was his “beloved wife” Beatrice, 
and in the event that was not possible, he wanted to honor his parents by 
leaving it to charity.163  Giving Irving’s estate to Robert and Seymour 
Radin would contradict all the available evidence concerning Irving’s 
testamentary intent, thereby arguably unjustly enriching his heirs.164 
The California Supreme Court concluded that no sound reason exists 
to forbid the reformation of unambiguous wills where the evidence 
justifies it.165  While not directly connecting the issue to the harmless error 
provision that the California legislature had recently adopted, the court 
implicitly connected the issues by discussing how the statute of wills and 
the statute of frauds both set forth formalities that should be satisfied 
before the writing is valid, but that the law has created exceptions to both 
statutes where there is clear and convincing evidence.166 Embracing 
Professor Langbein’s logic, the California Supreme Court concluded that 
the clear and convincing evidence civil standard provides sufficient 
safeguards to adopt the modern trend, intent-based power-to-reform 
doctrine.167 
The equities of the Caspary case and the Duke case are strong.  Both 
involve a loving child whose testamentary wish is to honor his parents, 
and such intent would be frustrated by the traditional approach to how 
much formality the law should require before giving effect to a will or 
 
 159.   Id. at 865. 
 160.   Id. at 865–66.  Apparently, he had expressly mentioned his brother Harry and not his sister 
Rose because Harry was alive at the time the will was executed but Rose was not. 
 161.   See id. at 865. 
 162.   Baron, supra note 132, at 11.  
 163.   Estate of Duke, 352 P.3d at 865. 
 164.   Id. at 865–68.  
 165.   Id. at 872–73, 880–81. 
 166.   Id. at 874–76.  
 167.   Id. at 873–76, 878–79.  
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testamentary transfer via a will.168  In both cases, the court had only two 
options, and while technically the law says it should favor one unless there 
is clear and convincing evidence that the other is the decedent’s intent, in 
both cases it is natural to ask which one is more likely the decedent’s 
probable intent.169  Is that, de facto, what the intent movement is all about, 
and if so, is that really so bad? 
As I struggled with the arguments on both sides of the debate, it 
dawned on me, if one pulls the lens back a bit, there is a common thread 
that connects both the Caspary and Duke cases.  In both cases, the intended 
gift that would have been frustrated if the court had applied the traditional 
approach was a philanthropic gift; a charitable gift.170  Might it be that the 
charitable nature of the gift in question is what justifies—if anything 
does—adopting the modern trend intent oriented approach? 
IX. THE SPECIAL LEGAL TREATMENT ACCORDED PHILANTHROPY 
While it is generally accepted that testamentary intent is a social good 
that should be given effect whenever possible, it is even more generally 
accepted that philanthropy is a social good that should be encouraged and 
facilitated whenever possible. “The implicit rationale runs like this: 
charitable organizations, charitable donors, and the government are all in 
the business of benefitting the public.  It makes sense, then, for the 
government to help charities and their donors do their good works . . . .”171 
 
 168.   Horton, supra note 127, at 2029; Estate of Duke, 352 P.3d at 865.  
 169.   Technically, probable intent is only supposed to be relevant for construction purposes, not 
validity purposes, but one can easily imagine courts have a hard time holding that line.  See In re Will 
of Smith, 528 A.2d 918, 922 (N.J. 1987), where the New Jersey Supreme Court noted “the doctrine of 
probable intent is available only to interpret, but not to validate, a will.  [The doctrine] comes into play 
only after a will is found to be valid” (internal citations omitted).  But the fact that the Court had to 
admonish the lower court implicitly acknowledges that some courts blur the line.  Id.  This potential 
is even greater in holographic will scenarios.  See generally Cox v. Towle (In re Estate of Williams), 
66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34 (Ct. App. 2007); Zhao v. Wong (In re Estate of Wong), 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707, 709–
10, 712–13 (Ct. App. 1995); and supra note 141 and accompanying text.  The will reformation doctrine 
is little more than probable intent; it goes to will construction, not validity.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Daniel 
Haskell, When Axiom Collide, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 817, 830 (1993).  Inasmuch as New Jersey is the 
state that pioneered the probable intent doctrine, see Reid Kress Weisbord & David Horton, 
Boilerplate and Default Rules in Wills: An Empirical Analysis, 103 IOWA L. REV. 663, 687–88 (2018).  
Is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s admonishment in Will of Smith a harbinger of things to come if 
the reformation doctrine is widely adopted?  See also Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of 
Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 645 (2009) (acknowledging that probable 
intent is already relevant to the doctrine of implied revocation).  Inasmuch as probable intent is already 
used for revocation purposes, and will revocation is the flip side of will execution, will the courts 
really hold the construction/validity line?  
 170.   Horton, supra note 127, at 2029; Estate of Duke, 352 P.3d at 866. 
 171.   Rob Atkinson, Tax Favors for Philanthropy: Should Our Republic Underwrite de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy?, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (2014) (emphasis added); see also John 
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Governmental support for charitable activities, and charitable 
contributions, has existed for centuries and is nearly universal.172  Charities 
existed and were granted special status during the times of the pharaohs in 
early Egypt, and during early Roman and Greek periods.173  Most countries 
embrace the assumption that charitable activities are a good and should be 
encouraged.174  Countries encourage and support charitable activities in a 
plethora of ways, all of which involve special treatment under the law.175 
The special legal treatment accorded charitable organizations 
evidences how far the law will go to encourage and support organizations 
that engage in charitable work that benefits the public: 
 Once an organization has been granted exempt status under § 
501(c)(3) it will receive significant government benefits, predominantly 
in the form of special tax treatment.  The privilege of receiving tax-
deductible contributions for income, estate, and gift tax purposes is 
perhaps the most well-known benefit.  However, in addition to this 
benefit, charitable organizations may qualify to issue tax-exempt bonds, 
avoid federal unemployment taxes, and provide tax-deferred retirement 
plans for their employees.  In addition to federal tax benefits, charitable 
organizations are generally eligible to receive tax benefits at the state 
level, although the benefits vary by jurisdiction.  Alongside the many tax 
benefits are nontax benefits such as preferred postage rates and potential 
exemptions from regulatory regimes such as antitrust, securities, labor, 
and bankruptcy.176 
Charitable trusts is another area of law where a number of special rules 
have been developed to facilitate and perpetuate charitable gifts.177  
 
A. Pearce II, The Rights of Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. REV. 
251, 254 (2015) (“The United States government supports corporate philanthropy through its tax 
policy.”) (footnote omitted). But see Elizabeth R. Carter, Tipping the Scales in Favor of Charitable 
Bequests: A Critique, 34 PACE L. REV. 983, 983–84 (2014) (acknowledging that “[p]ublic policy 
favors testamentary bequests to charity” but arguing “that the policy favoring charitable giving has 
gone too far.”). 
 172.  Patton, supra note 39 at 134; Carter, supra note 171, at 1002–12; Susan N. Gary, Restricted 
Charitable Gifts: Public Benefit, Public Voice, 81 ALB. L. REV. 565, 570 (2018) (“[T]he idea that 
charities and charitable trusts have a public purpose goes back centuries.”). 
 173.   Patton, supra note 39 at 134; Carter, supra note 171, at 1002–12. 
 174.   Patton, supra note 39 at 134; Carter, supra note 171, at 1002–12.  See also, Susan Pace 
Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 
703–10 (2006).  
 175.   Patton, supra note 39 at 134; Carter, supra note 171, at 1002–12.   
 176.   Tiffany Keb, Comment, Redefining What it Means to Be Charitable: Raising the Bar with 
a Public Benefit Requirement, 86 OR. L. REV. 865, 870 (2007) (footnotes omitted); see also Gary, 
supra note 172, at 570 (“The idea that charity provides a public benefit can be seen throughout the 
history of charities law in England.”); Carter, supra note 171, at 1016–17. 
 177.   See generally Mark A. Barwise, The Modern Charitable Trust, 9 ME. L. REV. 225 (1916) 
(discussing the history of the legal treatment of charitable trusts); Craig Kaufman, Sympathy for the 
Devil’s Advocate: Assisting the Attorney General When Charitable Matters Reach the Courtroom, 40 
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Charitable trusts are exempt from the private trust requirement that there 
be identifiable beneficiaries who have standing to sue the trustee to enforce 
the terms of the trust.178  Moreover, charitable trusts are not subject to the 
Rule Against Perpetuities.179  Permitting perpetual trusts and trusts with 
no ascertainable beneficiaries increase trust administration issues down 
the road, thereby increasing costs of administration for society.180  
Nevertheless, the law accepts such costs because of the offsetting benefits 
to society: “The courts have refused to apply any rule limiting the duration 
of trusts to charitable trusts because they have felt that the social 
advantages of such trusts more than offset the disadvantages . . . .”181  The 
cost-benefit analysis associated with charitable gifts is different from the 
cost-benefit associated with non-charitable gifts because of the public 
benefit associated with charitable gifts. 
Arguably the best example of how far the law is willing to go to take 
advantage of the benefits associated with charitable gifts is the cy pres 
doctrine.  The cy pres doctrine traces its roots back to the English courts 
 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 705, 710–11 (2006): 
 
  Modern charitable trust law has its roots in England because the charitable trust is an 
invention of the English judiciary, enforceable in equity.  Indeed, because the charitable 
trust is a favored creation of the law enjoying the exceptional attentiveness of courts of 
equity, a liberal interpretation is often employed to uphold this type of trust.  
 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 178.   GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, AMY MORRIS HESS, NORMAN M. 
ABRAMSON & SUSAN GARY, BOGERT’S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 323 (last updated June 
2020) (“A private trust must have an identifiable beneficiary or beneficiaries, but this requirement 
does not apply to the creation of a charitable trust.”) (footnote omitted).  See also, Verner F. Chaffin, 
Georgia’s Proposed Dynasty Trust: Giving the Dead Too Much Control?, 35 GA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) 
(“a charitable trust need not have identifiable beneficiaries”) (footnote omitted); Mosk v. United Cal. 
Bank (In re Estate of McKenzie), 38 Cal. Rptr. 496, 497–98 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). 
 179.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 (AM. L. INST. 1959); BOGERT ET AL., supra note 
178, § 351; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28, cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2003); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.3(2) (AM. L. INST. 2003). 
 180.   Gary, supra note 172, at 573 (“The lack of a beneficiary with the power and incentive to 
enforce the trust, creates a problem for oversight and enforcement.”) (footnote omitted); see also Susan 
N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. 
Haw. L. Rev. 593, 596 (1999); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable 
Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227 (1999); Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1307, 1321 (2010) (“To make the most of the charitable dollar in trust, courts must 
have the power to modify the charitable trust to prevent that dollar from being wasted on outmoded 
charitable initiatives.”). 
 181.   BOGERT ET AL., supra note 178, § 351, n.6 (“The public policy reason that charitable trusts 
should be treated differently than private trusts with respect to the applicability of I.C. § 55-111 is the 
great benefit to society arising from charitable trusts.”) (citing In re Coleman’s Estate, 138 P. 992 (Cal. 
1914)); see also Storr’s Agricultural School v. Whitney, 8 A. 141, 143 (Conn. 1887) (“The law favors 
charitable uses.  It does so with knowledge that in most cases they are intended to be practically 
perpetual; and it is willing to permit what of evil results from the devotion of property to such length 
of use in consideration of the beneficent results flowing therefrom.”). 
254 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
of equity.182  The courts of equity bent, ignored, and/or created law in 
pursuit of giving maximum effect to charitable gifts and charitable 
activities: 
[I]nstitutions that devoted their properties to one or more . . . charitable 
uses or that had property entrusted to them for . . . charitable uses 
received a variety of equitable privileges.  Special trust and testamentary 
doctrines, like the cy pres doctrine, enabled the institutions to receive 
property by deeds and wills that were defective in form and generally 
unenforceable at common law.  Special property rules enabled them to 
transfer goods and lands to beneficiaries, free from liens, fees, and 
excises.  Special procedural rules allowed them to bring actions that were 
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations or by the doctrine of laches. 
Special tax rules afforded them both tax subsidies and tax exemptions.  
These charitable institutions received subsidies from the “poor rates,” 
“education rates,” and “charity taxes” that the authorities occasionally 
levied on the community.  They received exemptions from taxes on those 
portions of their property that were “devoted to charitable uses and other 
public concernments.”183 
The cy pres doctrine evidences how far the law will bend to give effect 
to charitable intent.  Cy pres saves an otherwise failing charitable gift, 
often at the expense of the donor’s heirs: 
 Although legal historians dispute the origins of the term, the principle 
of cy pres can be traced back at least as far as the sixth-century Roman 
Empire.  The close relation between law and religion during the Middle 
Ages, especially at the time of death, likely gave rise to cy pres in English 
law.  In medieval England, the deceased’s estate was commonly divided, 
with one third (“the dead’s part”) applied by the administrators “for the 
good of his soul in such pious works as they shall think best according 
to God and good conscience.”  The courts recognized that the public 
benefit of charitable acts, and the value to the testator’s soul, would be 
lost if such charitable donations reverted to the heirs when the gift 
intended could not be completed.  To avoid this outcome, the courts 
would rededicate the gift to an alternative use in line with the donor’s 
intentions.  These early principles of cy pres were adopted and codified 
in the Statute of Charitable Uses, a broad statute with “such medicinal 
qualities in it, as to heal every imperfection in a charitable disposition, 
provided the party had a legal capacity to give at all.”184 
While the conventional wisdom is that cy pres is an intent saving 
 
 182.   Barwise, supra note 177, at 230–31. 
 183.   John Witte Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid 
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 377 (1991) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 184.   Chris J. Chasin, Modernizing Class Action Cy Pres through Democratic Inputs: A Return to 
Cy Pres Comme Possible, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1465–66 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
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doctrine, which implies it is a pro-intent doctrine, it needs to be 
remembered that the intent is only worth saving because of the public 
benefits associated with it because of the charitable gift it saves. 
 Another source of confusion concerning the cy pres doctrine as it was 
introduced to the American courts lies in the overemphasis placed upon 
the effectuation of the donor’s intent.  It appears quite certain that the 
doctrine did not originate solely as an intent-enforcing device.  It has 
been suggested that the actual origin of cy pres is to be found in the civil 
law. 
 There are Roman cases wherein memorial gifts for specified purposes 
were, when found illegal, applied to proper objectives in order that the 
memory of the donor might be preserved.  There seems to be as much 
emphasis upon the social benefit to be derived from such gifts as on any 
desire to effectuate the donor’s intention.  The rationale of these cases is 
that it would be unjust for a gift destined for charitable ends to fall back 
to the heirs because of some technical difficulty . . . .  In origin, then, it 
would appear that cy pres was employed chiefly with the aim of 
advancing purposes believed to be of great social benefit.  Gradually, 
however, this emphasis changed; judicial cy pres tended more and more 
to become a rule of construction and solely an intent-enforcing 
instrument. 
. . . . 
 In these three types of cases there seems no sound reason for denying 
validity.  The social desirability of maintaining these donations in 
charitable channels is conceded.  The donor has shown his intent to 
devote the fund to charitable purposes rather than to his heirs.185 
For centuries the courts of equity have used cy pres to give effect to 
charitable intent that otherwise would fail.186  While the effect of the 
doctrine has been to promote the donor’s intent, technically the rationale 
underlying the doctrine is not the donor’s intent per se but rather the public 
benefits associated with the charitable intent.187 
 
 185.   A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L. J. 303, 309–10, 313 (1939) (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis added); see also Kaufman, supra note 177, at 714 (“Permitting judicial action to remodel 
the trust preserves the public benefits of charitable trusts . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 186.   A Revaluation of Cy Pres, supra note 185, at 311.  
 187.   Chasin, supra note 184, at 1465–66.  At early common law, there were two forms of cy pres: 
prerogative cy pres and judicial cy pres.  A Revaluation of Cy Pres, supra note 185, at 303–06; Lopez, 
supra note 180, at 1313.  Judicial cy pres saved an ineffective charitable gift by invoking the court’s 
equitable powers to save it for another purpose as close as possible to the donor’s original charitable 
objective.  Id. at 1314.  On the other hand, prerogative cy pres was a “power of the Crown,” the court 
was merely the agent which implemented the Crown’s power.  Id. at 1313–17.  Prerogative cy pres 
saved an otherwise failing charitable gift for whatever specific charitable purpose the Crown deemed 
appropriate, regardless of the donor’s original charitable objective.  Id.  While judicial cy pres arguably 
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Circling back to the Caspary and Duke cases, is it solely the “testator’s 
intent” that is driving the equities and analysis of those cases, or is the 
distinguishing variable the fact that in both cases the gift otherwise would 
have gone to charities that would have put the gift to public good?  To the 
extent the testamentary intent movement seeks to lower the legal bar that 
is required before giving effect to a testamentary gift, the normative case 
for such change in the law can be made much easier with respect to 
charitable testamentary gifts than non-charitable testamentary gifts.  
Charitable testamentary gifts are for the public good, so the benefits of 
giving effect to such gifts—either through the harmless error doctrine or 
the power to reform—on average will exceed the costs.188  Testamentary 
gifts differ from inter vivos gifts because of the finality of the attempted 
testamentary transfers.  Invalidating an attempted inter vivos charitable 
transfer presumedly has little cost because if the transferor still has the 
same intent, he or she can simply re-execute the transfer to correct the 
mistake.189  Invalidating an attempted testamentary charitable transfer 
carries greater costs with it because of the finality inherent in testamentary 
gifts.  The donor does not have a chance to cure the defect.  In such 
 
is more of a rule of construction, prerogative cy pres is more of a curative doctrine.  See, e.g., Chasin, 
supra note 184, at 1466–67.  In both scenarios, however: 
 
The doctrine proceeds upon the principle that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the 
general intention of the testator as nearly as possible, where the testator’s subsidiary intent 
that the gift take effect in a particular manner is impossible of realization.  If the essential 
and dominant purpose of the testator may be fulfilled, the cy pres doctrine will be invoked 
to save the gift. 
 
Anne E. Melley, 18 N.Y. JUR. 2D CHARITIES § 45 (2020) (footnotes omitted).  Cy pres has had a mixed 
history in America because of the controversial nature of prerogative cy pres and England’s failure to 
delineate when the different versions of cy pres applied.  Lopez, supra note 180, at 1319–25.  Not all 
states recognize cy pres, and those that do tend to recognize judicial cy pres, but not prerogative cy 
pres.  See A Revaluation of Cy Pres, supra note 185, at 307–08.  The driving force behind the doctrine 
of cy pres, however, is, consistent with the donor’s intent, ensuring use of the property for the public 
good.  Id. at 313.   
 188.   See supra notes 171–85, and accompanying text. 
 189.   Some have argued that where a donor expresses the intent to make an inter vivos gift but 
dies unexpectedly before delivering the item, the courts should save the gift by (1) recharacterizing 
the intent to make an outright gift as a declaration of trust, (2) appointing a successor trustee, and (3) 
ordering the new trustee to deliver the intended gift item to the donee.  Understandably, there has been 
criticism of such a remedy because (a) the donor did not have the intent to create a trust so re-
characterizing the donor’s intent is a sham; and (b) the cost-benefit analysis in question.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts rejects this approach.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 16(2) 
(AM. L. INST. 2003).  The comments to the section walk back the official position a bit.  See id. at cmt. 
d.  The Restatement (Third) of Property moots the issue by eliminating the traditional requirement that 
the item being gifted must be delivered.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. yy (AM. L. INST. 2003).  Limiting the elimination of the delivery requirement 
to failed inter vivos charitable gifts where the donor dies before having a chance to remedy the mistake 
is more defensible both doctrinally and from a public policy perspective. 
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circumstances, both as a doctrinal matter and as a matter of public policy, 
it makes sense to adopt the modern trend intent approach as set forth in the 
harmless error and the power to reform doctrines to save the otherwise 
failing testamentary charitable gift.190 
X. CONCLUSION 
In his article Defective Catastrophe Clauses in Wills: Paths to Reform, 
Professor Adam Hirsch takes the California Supreme Court to task for its 
opinion in Duke. 191  His assessment of the Court’s opinion is reflected in 
the heading of the section which analyzes the opinion: “The Duke 
Debacle.”192  Professor Hirsch criticizes the Court for adopting a remedy 
that is “ill-fitted to the facts of the case.”193 
 
 190.   A latent issue not raised directly by either the Caspary or Duke case is how the courts should 
treat a will that includes one or more charitable gifts, as well as a number of noncharitable gifts.  Erring 
on the side of encouraging and facilitating charitable gifts, as the law has historically done, the intent 
oriented harmless error doctrine should apply to any will that includes at least one meaningful (i.e., 
non-sham) charitable gift.  The situation is analogous to charitable split-interest trusts.  Charitable 
split-interest trusts (i.e., deferred gifts and charitable remainder trusts in particular) are excellent 
examples of where the law permits mixed charitable and noncharitable gifts and accords special 
treatment to such trusts (significant estate, gift, and income tax benefits) to promote and facilitate 
charitable gifts.  See generally Gregory L. Prescott & James R. Hardin, Charitable Remainder Trusts: 
A Popular and Effective Estate Planning Tool, 98 PRAC. TAX. STRATEGIES 183 (2017); Christopher 
R. Hoyt, Transfers from Retirement Plans to Charities and Charitable Remainder Trusts: Laws, Issues 
and Opportunities, 13 VA. TAX REV. 641, 669–702 (1994) (As of 1991, there were “over 36,000 
charitable remainder trusts that [held] over $8 billion of assets”).  Inasmuch as the power to reform is 
gift specific, not document specific, no such latent issues arise with respect to extending it to failed 
testamentary charitable gifts but not to failed testamentary noncharitable gifts. 
 191.   Adam J. Hirsch, Defective Catastrophe Clauses in Wills: Paths to Reform, 52 REAL PROP. 
TRUST & ESTATE L. J. 339, 341–50 (2018) [hereinafter, Hirsch, Destructive Catastrophe Clauses]. 
 192.   Id. at 341. 
 193.   Id. at 345.  His analysis starts with the California Supreme Court’s articulation of the power 
to reform: “an unambiguous will may be reformed if clear and convincing evidence establishes that 
the will contains a mistake in the expression of the testator’s intent at the time the will was drafted and 
also establishes the testator’s actual specific intent at the time the will was drafted.”  Id. (quoting Estate 
of Duke, 352 P.3d at 865.).  That gives rise to the question of what constitutes a “mistake in the 
expression.”  Professor Hirsch shows how that phrase, “mistake in expression,” is a term of art.  Hirsch, 
Destructive Catastrophe Clauses, supra note 191, at 343–45.  As that term has been used historically 
and currently, the heirs in the Estate of Duke case should have a difficult time carrying their burden of 
proof.  Id. at 345–47.  Prof. Hirsch goes on to criticize the Court for apparently conflating two very 
different types of drafting mistakes: 
 
The court in Duke collapsed inartful expression with clerical error as characteristics of a 
will eligible for reformation.  In other words, the court asserted a power to correct wills 
that not only fail to say what they are supposed to say, but also appear not to mean what 
they are supposed to mean.   
 
Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).  Professor Hirsch notes that extrinsic evidence with respect to 
meaning typically will come “from third parties who might or might not be interested,” implicitly 
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While I agree with Professor Hirsch that the California Supreme 
Court’s opinion in the Duke case is a debacle that is ill-fitted for the facts, 
I respectfully submit that the reason for the debacle is the Court failed to 
address the elephant in the opinion: the charitable nature of the 
testamentary gift.  There is a long and rich history of the law according 
special status to charitable gifts.194  The charitable nature of the 
testamentary gift in the Duke case is the “good cause” that justifies 
adopting and applying the power-to-reform doctrine.195 
Professor Hirsch wraps up his analysis of the Duke case by stating that 
not all legal errors are of equal cost: “To be sure, an evaluation that some 
legal errors are more costly than others is perfectly plausible and 
sometimes justifiable.”196  He notes that “the English treatise writer 
Charles Fearne paraphrased Blackstone,” asserting that giving effect to 
fraudulent testamentary intent would be worse than convicting an innocent 
man: 
In defense of the traditional rules of will construction excluding extrinsic 
evidence altogether, Fearne averred that “it is better that the intentions 
of twenty testators, every week, should fail of effect, than those rules 
should be departed from, upon which the general security of titles and 
quiet enjoyment of property so essentially depend.”197 
With respect to Fearne’s assertion that not all failed gifts are equal, 
Professor Hirsch commented that “the rationale for favoring one category 
of beneficiary over another would demand analysis.”198 
With respect to favoring intended beneficiaries of failed charitable 
testamentary gifts, the analysis is obvious.  Granting preferential treatment 
to failed charitable testamentary gifts is not only logical and defensible, it 
is consistent with the longstanding and widespread legal tradition of 
according favorable treatment to charitable gifts.  The Duke and Caspary 
cases, viewed properly as failed charitable testamentary gift cases, 
evidence the merit of according such failed gifts special treatment.  
 
acknowledging that the California Supreme Court’s power to reform doctrine will significantly 
increase costs of administration and the potential for fraud.  Id.  Professor Hirsch wraps up his analysis 
with a rather interesting comment: “Whether the court in Duke understood what it was doing—whether 
this was all just pretense in a good cause—remains unclear.”  Id. at 348.  Apparently by “all just 
pretense in a good cause” Prof. Hirsch was referring to the modern trend intent movement; that giving 
more effect to testamentary intent is a good cause.   
 194.   See supra notes 171–187, and accompanying text. 
 195.   Hirsch, Destructive Catastrophe Clauses, supra note 191, at 348. 
 196.   Id. at 349.  
 197.   Id. at 349–350 (quoting 1 CHARLES FEARNE, AN ESSAY ON THE LEARNING OF CONTINGENT 
REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES 172–73 (Charles Butler & Josiah W. Smith eds., 10th 
ed.1845)) (footnote omitted). 
 198.   Id. at 350 (footnote omitted). 
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Because of the public benefits inherent in charitable gifts, the cost-benefit 
analysis of applying the harmless error and/or the power-to-reform 
doctrines to failed charitable testamentary gifts makes sense and is good 
public policy.  Where the failed testamentary gift is a charitable gift, the 
traditionalists should find common ground with the intent-oriented 
advocates. 
Removing failed charitable testamentary gifts from the universe of 
failed testamentary gifts199 also reframes the issue of whether the harmless 
error and/or power-to-reform doctrines should apply to the remaining 
cases.  Assume, arguendo, that the failed gift in Duke had been to a friend, 
not a charity.  In light of the fact that Irving Duke, a multi-millionaire, did 
not care enough about his testamentary intent to go to an attorney to ensure 
that the gift was properly expressed, why should the state spend thousands 
of dollars to ascertain and give effect to his non-charitable testamentary 
intent?  Where the failed testamentary gift is a noncharitable gift, should 
limited public resources be spent trying to ascertain and give effect to the 
decedent’s intent?  Would it be better to spend those limited public 
resources on other, more pressing social problems?200  Where the failed 
testamentary gift is a noncharitable gift, the absence of public benefits 
makes the cost-benefit analysis of adopting and applying the harmless 
error and/or the power-to-reform doctrines to the failed gift more difficult. 
Let the debate begin anew. 
 
 
 199.   Removing them because it is assumed, arguendo, that it makes sense to apply the harmless 
error and/or the power-to-reform doctrines. 
 200.   See Wendel, Flawed Narrative, supra note 7, at 387. 
 
With the myriad of competing claims on public resources, it is poor public policy to spend 
excessive public funds on ascertaining testator’s intent when imposing reasonable 
formalities on testators, reasonably interpreted and reasonably applied, can save society 
money and permit society to allocate its scarce resources to more pressing needs. 
 
Id. 
